Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

CHAPTER 9
NEW START AND NONPROLIFERATION:
SUITORS OR SEPARATE TABLES?
INTRODUCTION
Stephen J. Cimbala
In the spring of 2010, the diplomatic atmosphere
was an apparent success story for those seeking to reduce
nuclear danger. The signing of the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement in April
2010 took place almost exactly 1 year after President
Barack Obama’s landmark speech calling for nuclear
abolition. New START was followed by the successful
outcome of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) review conference in May 2010, in marked
contrast to the acrimonious denouement of the 2005
meeting. 1 In addition, a U.S. Nuclear Posture Review
and a revised Russian Military Doctrine made public
in the spring of 2010 also seemed to reduce the role of
nuclear weapons in the respective military strategies
and national security policies of the two states. Russia,
the United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) talked of cooperation on missile
defense and other issues, and Obama pushed forward
an ambitious agenda of multilateral control measures,
including ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTB) and global support for a Fissile Materials
Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Only Maurice Chevalier, strolling
and singing on a boulevard in Paris, was lacking
for suitable background music.
Diplomatic atmospheres come and go, but the bankers
of policy and strategy demand payment in hard
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