Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

American superpower. In 2002, Nikonov had written
of a China already transforming itself economically
and strategically focusing on the unification of Taiwan
with the PRC as its primary strategic objective.
Nikonov projected a relatively slow transformation of
the Chinese military over the next 25 years, making
the East in the form of the PRC relatively low risk in
terms of security. Sadchikov characterizes the fourth
campaign to the East as an adaptation of Beijing’s
strategy to Russian circumstances: “In its time, China
formulated its own strategy: lean on the north, stabilize
the west, and expand to the south and east. According
to Nikonov, Moscow’s present strategy must
be lean on the west, stabilize the south, and go east.” 63
With the military addressing a separatist threat that
obtains armed assistance from abroad and the political
leadership committed to going East, one must still
ask what were the underlying threats driving the General
Staff’s accumulation of vignettes.
Looking at the various episodes that made up the
scenario for Vostok-2010, one could conclude that going
east has its own peculiar risks for Russia. The refugee
scenario for North Korea highlights the instability
of that regime and the likelihood of conflict developing
out of its disintegration or from its desperate acts
to sustain its position. Fear that a U.S.-Chinese conflict
in the wake of the collapse of North Korea would
impose difficult strategic choices upon Moscow has
been a regular theme for press commentary concerning
Korea. The sharp exchange between Moscow and
Tokyo over the exercise in the disputed Kuril Islands
highlights the troubled state of Russo-Japanese relations
and brings into the strategic calculation the U.S.-
Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 64
Just as President Medvedev was visiting the nuclear
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