Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

and NATO provocations.” In particular, he argued in
support of targeting the proposed elements of the U.S.
third BMD site in Eastern Europe by Russian tactical
and strategic means including nuclear. 97
In 2009, the current Secretary of the Security Council
and former Director of the Federal Security Service,
Nikolai Patrushev, sent up still another apparent trial
balloon dealing with expanded uses of nuclear weapons
for preemption and prevention in the RF Military
Doctrine revision. While asserting that Moscow’s
main goal was to preserve its nuclear power status,
he claimed the Doctrine will change conditions for
the deployment of nuclear weapons to allow their use
“not only in global but also regional and even local
conflicts.” According to Patrushev,
The conditions for the use of nuclear weapons to repel
aggression with the use of conventional weaponry
in large-scale, but also in regional and even in a local
war have been corrected. Moreover, in situations critical
for national security, the inflicting of a preventive
nuclear strike upon an aggressor is not excluded. 98
The new RF Military Doctrine was finally approved
by President Dmitrii Medvedev by virtue of his Decree
No. 146 of February 5, 2010. At the same time,
Medvedev signed “The Foundations of State Policy
in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020,” which
was not made public. Opinions differed on the significance
of this version of the Doctrine, particularly
on the meaning of clauses related to nuclear weapons
use. In the opinion of some Russian experts, “it made
one more step away from Russia’s obligation not to
be first in the use of nuclear weapons.” 99 A Western
observer notes in this connection:
131