Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

tion of that leg was still minimal. In that case, Russia
might seek much deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals than
otherwise likely and the mission of strategic deterrence
would be supported by the SRF while de-escalation
would still be entrusted to the Air Force. In the
end, transition from a triad to a dyad might be a good
choice, but it appears unlikely for political reasons
and also because too much money has already been
spent on Bulava—it is difficult to imagine a political
or military leader who would be willing to accept responsibility
for the failure.
AIR FORCE
The Air Force never played a major role in the Soviet
nuclear posture; its share in the strategic arsenal
was limited to about 5 percent of deployed warheads.
This choice is easy to explain by the traditional drawbacks
of Soviet aircraft-building (especially in engines
and navigational equipment) as well as the long distances
heavy bombers had to cover to reach the United
States, meaning a very long gap between decision to
launch and delivery as well as very limited payload.
The situation began to change somewhat in the 1980s
after the Soviet Union succeeded in development of
long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).
Posture plans drawn in the late 1980s foresaw some
(albeit still limited) increase in the share of warheads
carried on heavy bombers.
In the post-Soviet time, the Air Force remained at
the back burner during the larger part of the 1990s
until Ukraine agreed to sell some heavy bombers to
Russia instead of eliminating them under START I.
This allowed increasing the number of heavy bombers
to a level that had at least some military sense. In
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