Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

and verifiable treaty on TNW was at that time rejected
by Washington.
Moreover, since 2004 Russia no longer recognizes
PNIs as even politically binding. The last time Moscow
formally reported on the implementation of PNIs
was at the NPT PrepCom in April 2004, when the
Russian representative mentioned that his country
had “almost completed implementation” of its “initiatives”
except for warheads assigned to Ground Forces,
and that the pace of elimination was constrained
by the technological capacity and available funding. 35
Six months later, an official representative of the Russian
Foreign Ministry declared Russia was not bound
by the PNIs, which were characterized as a goodwill
gesture rather than an obligation. 36
That said, PNIs have apparently been implemented,
even though Russia does not publicly recognize
that. In a report distributed at the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, Russia declared that it had reduced its
TNW arsenal to one-fourth of what it was in 1991. 37
The following year, the Chief of the 12th Glavnoye
Upravleniye Ministerstvo Oborony (GUMO, the Main
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense responsible for
handling nuclear weapons), confirmed that information
and even asserted that reductions exceeded the
original promise (he asserted that the 1991 statements
foresaw a 64 percent reduction while Russia had reduced
its TNW arsenal by 75 percent). 38 Speaking
in 2007, the new Chief of the 12th GUMO, General
Vladimir Verkhovtsev, confirmed the 75 percent figure
and added that the promised elimination of TNW
warheads assigned to Ground Forces had been completed.
39
The exact number of Russian TNW is unknown because
parties to the PNIs are not required to exchange
215