Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

it endangers the Russian state (a provision not in the
first 1993 doctrine).
In both documents, the declared purpose of Russian
nuclear weapons is to deter other countries from
engaging in a military conflict with Russia. Like the
United States and the other declared nuclear weapons
states, with the notable exception of China, the Russian
Government has refused since the release of its
November 1993 Military Doctrine to declare in public
its adherence to an unqualified no nuclear-first-use
posture. 18 In principle, Russian officials are prepared
to start a nuclear war in an emergency. These declaratory
statements still appear operationally relevant,
since Russian military forces continue to conduct
large-scale exercises with scenarios involving possible
nuclear use—though these seem to involve longerrange
strategic systems rather than tactical nuclear
weapons. 19
Despite expectations based on earlier statements
by the Russian Government, the 2010 doctrine does
not expand the range of permissible uses of nuclear
weapons to include preventive or preemptive nuclear
strikes or explicitly affirm Russia’s right to employ
nuclear weapons for regional and even local wars
against terrorists. Such an expansive posture was offered
in several apparent trial balloon statements by
senior Russian military and security policymakers in
the years before the 2010 Military Doctrine was published,
including General Yuri Baluyevsky, head of
the Russian General Staff and First Deputy Defense
Minister. 20 Likewise, Security Council Secretary Nikolai
Patrushev made the following statement to the Rossiyskaya
Gazeta concerning the draft of the new Military
Doctrine then under consideration: “The conduct
of a nuclear strike against an aggressor, including a
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