Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

combined. 23 The prestigious General Staff Academy
had its 17 chairs reduced to two (the art of war and
national security and defense) and instead of its usual
100-120 annual graduates, admitted only 16 students
at the one-star level in 2009-10. These were taught a
revised curriculum (for example, students no longer
needed to study the division). 24
It is also worth noting that, just as President Medvedev
and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are commonly
referred to as the ruling “tandem,” so too in defense
terms there is also an effective tandem: Serdyukov and
Makarov. The latter had his service extended by presidential
decree after reaching retirement age (60) in
October 2009. This partnership between the first truly
civilian Russian defense minister (Sergei Ivanov was a
former Federal Security Service (Federal’naya Sluzhba
Bezopasnosti) [FSB] officer) and the Chief of the General
Staff (CGS) may well be instrumental in promoting
and conducting the reform, but it would be misleading
to characterize the reform as being the work of a
small or maverick elite: it simply could not be enacted
without the active participation of many other actors;
particularly the siloviki (military politicians).
Contradictions and Challenges.
Almost 2 years into the reform, numerous contradictions
and challenges have surfaced. How can such
high levels of readiness be achieved if the manning of
such brigades is mostly based upon 12-month-service
conscripts? Is this enough time to train and achieve
necessary standards? There is no consensus within the
defense ministry and General Staff on the precise nature
of the manning system: a widespread recognition
that the experiment with contract personnel has failed
39