Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

perceived battlefield desperation.” 37 Additionally, as
Nikolai Sokov has explained:
The continuing weakness of Russian conventional
forces vis-à-vis U.S. and combined NATO power as
well as the close proximity of NATO forces to Russian
territory (making limited use of force both more
feasible and more effective) have led Russian military
planners to rely on nuclear weapons for the purpose
of de-escalation—the threat of a limited nuclear strike
in response to a conventional attack that cannot be repelled
by conventional forces is supposed to deter the
attack in the first place. 38
The group of experts tasked in 2010 to prepare
guidelines for the revision of NATO’s strategic concept
nevertheless endorsed the alliance’s deployment
of U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons by noting that,
as long as nuclear weapons “remain a reality in international
relations,” NATO should retain a nuclear
component to its deterrent strategy at the minimum
level required by the international security environment.
39 The rationales for this position are that the retention
of some U.S. forward deployed nuclear weapons
on European territory will support “extended
nuclear deterrence and collective defense.” 40 Having it
both ways, as it were, the NATO group of experts also
calls for “an ongoing nuclear dialogue with Russia” to
expedite the further reduction, and possible elimination,
of “the entire class of sub-strategic weapons.” 41
Proposals from European politicians calling for the
removal of U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons from
NATO Europe, especially in the absence of some quid
pro quo from Russia, are certain to meet with resistance
across the Atlantic. 42 Russia will be cautious about reciprocating.
The “going in” position for Russia will
be that the first step should be taken by the United
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