Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

army.lv/ru/yadernoe-oruzhie/901/24532. It has not been indicated,
however, whether Moscow intends to include the numbers and
types of tactical nuclear weapons in its possession if and when
this information is released.
2. For a more detailed assessment of these issues, see Andrei
Shoumikhin, “Goals and Methods of Russian Arms Control Policy:
Implications for U.S. Security,” National Institute for Public Policy,
August 2008, available from nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/
Publication%20Archive%20PDF/Russian%20Arms%20Control%20
web.pdf.
3. The Kremlin relies on various institutional mechanisms
in defining the Russian military, including nuclear and foreign
policy. They include the Russian Security Council, the presidential
administration, appropriate legislative and technical bodies
of the Federal Assembly—the Russian two-chamber parliament
consisting of the State Duma and the Council of Federation, such
as the committees and commissions on defense, national security,
and international affairs; as well as professional apparatuses of
government ministries and other bodies, particularly the Foreign
Ministry of the Russian Federation, the Defense Ministry, and the
Ministry of Atomic Energy. Relatively speaking, there is currently
a greater variety of sources for military and foreign policymaking
than under the Soviet system. The ongoing, albeit slow, process
of the formation of civil society in Russia, including greater
freedom of speech and expression allowed various academic and
educational institutions, public organizations, think-tanks, expert
associations, individual specialists, and representatives of mass
media to speak freely on foreign and military matters, particularly
arms control policy and negotiation; the military reform; and
civilian control of the armed forces. The Council on Foreign and
Defense Policy (see www.svop.ru); Center for Arms Control, Energy
and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics
and Technology (see www.armscontrol.ru/); The Russian Center for
Policy Studies (see www.pircenter.org); and the Institute for Political
and Military Analysis (see www.ipma.ru).
4. See Andrei Shoumikhin, “Change and Continuity in Russian
Arms Control,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, Issue 2, 2009,
pp. 140-153.
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