Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

systems, our partners may come to feel completely
safe. After the balance is broken, they will do whatever
they want and grow more aggressive. . . . In order to
preserve a balance, while we aren’t planning to build a
missile defense of our own, as it’s very expensive and
its efficiency is not quite clear yet, we have to develop
offensive strike systems. 12
But at the March 5, 2010, expanded session of the
Defense Ministry Collegium, Medvedev made it clear
that Russia does not need to increase its offensive
nuclear capability any further than was originally
planned. 13 Thus the divisions between the two men
on this issue are out in the open. But their resolution
will take place in a tough context for innovative and
nonbelligerent policymaking where strong trends for
greater reliance on nuclear weapons, regardless of
quantity, will exist.
In the domestic context, the recent admission that
the effort to build a professional Army was a failure
and that Russia is returning to conscription has
profound objective consequences for overall defense
policy. 14 Indeed, Russia is even radically cutting the
number of contract positions in ways that do not affect
(so it says) its combat capability. 15 As regards
nuclear issues, this failure means that Russia had to
forsake the dream of a professional highly educated
and motivated Army capable of fighting a high-tech
conventional, and most likely, local war. While there
will undoubtedly be pockets of excellence, the ensuing
Russian Army will probably be unable to fully optimize
the use of high-tech systems and will be plagued
by low morale, education, health levels, large-scale
draft evasion, and corruption. This outcome suggests
that Russia may well have to invoke nuclear forces in
many cases to substitute for what would otherwise
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