Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

U.S nuclear weapons during the Cold War was to support
the “coupling” of American and NATO European
strategic commitments against Soviet intimidation
or nuclear blackmail. Now decades beyond the Cold
War, leading military experts and politicians within
NATO Europe have recommended that these weapons
should be removed and dismantled. 34
Both the political and military rationales for U.S.
sub-strategic weapons deployed in allied NATO
states have been called into question. The political
rationale of deterrence “coupling” seems beside the
point if NATO and Russia are no longer declared or
de facto enemies. The military rationale, or the need
for a tactical nuclear option as part of an escalation
“ladder” that would allow NATO to skirmish with
Russia in increments, but short of total war, demands
nuanced performance from command, control, and
communications (C3) systems, and commanders on
both sides. Otherwise escalation control turns into
mutual confusion. Although current Russian military
doctrine stipulates that NATO is a “danger” instead of
a “threat,” Russian military concerns about a NATO
conventional first strike option near Russia or within
its state territory argue against a long pause between
rungs of its escalation ladder. 35
Some Russian strategists support the use of a small
number of tactical nuclear weapons for the de-escalation
of a conventional war based on the shock value of
a nuclear “first use” option to obtain a favorable war
termination. But such a use, as opposed to the threat
of nuclear force employment, could backfire, causing
a retaliatory and larger escalation by the opponent. 36
As Pavel Baev noted, “deficiencies in Russia’s conventional
military forces might increase the appeal of
nuclear weapons under the exigent circumstances of
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