INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREA CO-MANAGEMENT (IPAC) - BIDS

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Net/boat owners are actually Mahajans who have to invest in nets and boats for fishing. Still many of them have to borrow from local moneylender or Aratdars to carry out hilsha fishing at a high interest rate (e.g., 5% for 15 days or so) on condition that they sell their entire catch to them throughout the year. With few exceptions, they do not go fishing directly. Usually, a fishing trip requires 10-15 days. Average cost of food for the fishermen in each trip is around Tk 10-12 thousand; average cost of fuel for engine in each trip is Tk 40-50 thousand; and average cost for ice per trip is around 10 thousand taka. The owners, however, have many risks. Sometimes they lose their whole investment due to cyclone and robbery. Aratdars usually works as commission agents. There is an association of Aratdars at each fish landing center. Fishermen, owners of the nets/boats and local Paikars bring their fish to the Arat. Paikars and local retailers participate in the process of auction to buy the fish. Koyal carry out the whole process of auction. Generally Paikars pay the value of fish to the Aratdars and Aratdars pay to the fish owners. Aratdars receive commission; usually it is 2.5 per cent from each side (i.e., 5% in total). Value Addition Table 5.4 presents costs and returns for hilsha fish. Monthly gross returns and net returns have been calculated. Net returns as percentage of working capital have also been calculated for each individual actor. It can be seen that the collectors provide the highest price value addition, a little less than two-thirds (63%) of the total price. Retailers create the next highest value addition (12.3%), followed by Majhis/Farias (10.0%), Choto Mahajans (8.3), Aratdars (2.7%), wholesalers (2.3%) and so on. Table 5.4: Value addition and return for hilsha Actor type Average selling price/Kg Price Value Addition (%) Collector 190 63.3 70 Majhi 220 10.0 683 Choto Mahajan 245 8.3 816 Boro 248 1.0 2532 Mahajan Aratdar 256 2.7 7500 Wholesaler 263 2.3 2957 Retailer 300 12.3 300 (2.0) Total - 100.0 14858 (100.0) Note: See note under Table 5.1. Cost and return for hilsha Av. G. Return Cost volume (Tk/month) (Tk/month) Per month (Kg) 13300 (0.47) (5.3) 20490 (4.6) (8.2) 44880 (5.5) (18.0) 70896 (17.0) (28.5) 67500 (50.5) (27.1) 20699 (19.9) (8.3) 11100 (4.5) 248865 (100.0) Net Return (Tk/month) 5140 8160 (4.2) 6352 14138 (7.3) 3990 40890 (21.0) 9994 60896 (31.3) 22500 45000 (23.1) 3726 16973 (8.7) 2410 8690 (4.5) - 194747 (100.0) Working capital Net Return as % WC - - 15500 91.2 68400 59.8 333330 21.3 366667 12.3 NA NA NA NA - - 104
Figure 5.16: Hilsha selling price (Tk per kg.) by actors Hilsha selling price (Tk per kg.) by actors 350 300 250 220 245 248 256 263 300 200 190 150 100 50 0 Collector Majhi Choto Mahajan Boro Mahajan Aratdar Wholesaler Retailer Volume of trade In contrast to lower price value addition, Aratdars trade in highest volume of products (e.g., more than half of total transaction (50.5%), followed by wholesalers (19.9%), Boro Mahajans (17.0%) and so on. Obviously, bottom actor types, Farias and collectors, deal in lowest quantity of trade, 4.6 percent and less than one percent (0.5%) respectively. Gross returns and net returns As regards gross returns, Boro Mahajans, Aratdars and Choto Mahajans get the highest absolute benefits, both for gross and net returns. Monthly net returns, for example, estimate as Tk 60,896, Tk 45,000 and Tk 40,800 for the three actors respectively. In terms of proportions, again, Boro Mahajans (28.5%), Aratdars (27.1%) and Choto Mahajans (18.0) are the highest beneficiaries. Similar is the trend for gross returns. Collectors or Beparis have net returns of only around 4 to 7 percent.. In absolute terms, the Boro Mahajans have net income more than 7 times as much compared to that earned by collectors. A large amount of working capital is often required to providing with dadons to hilsha fishers. Incorporating investment, net returns over working capital (NRWC) is found to be the highest for Majhis/Beparis (132%) as they need little working capital. Aside from that, Choto Mahajans have relatively better NRWC (59.8%), followed by Boro Mahajans (21.3%) and Aratdars (12.3%). 105
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INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREA CO-MANAGE
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Washington, DC 20036 202-289-0100 F
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money lenders) who were often suspi
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2.1 Profile of SIZ Districts ......
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5.3.6 Shrimp Small (galda and bagda
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Table 3.13: Distance of harvest pla
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Table 5.20: Distribution of SRF act
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Figure 5.1: Basic structure of SRF
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Figure 5.55: Distribution of income
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Acronyms and Abbreviations ACF = As
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Glossary Arat Aratdar Bahaddar Baza
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In particular, the study is expecte
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Characteristics of SRF Actors and P
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The most difficult problem that had
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GDP and Livelihoods Based on availa
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Occupation Pattern of SRF Collector
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Chapter 4: Mapping for Core Steps a
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Nevertheless, the shrimp fry collec
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Crab Chain: Collector ⇒ Mahajan
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Value addition and return for gura
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Value addition and return for hilsh
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Wholesaler 3.1 26.1 19.3 Retailer 1
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Crab Crab collectors provide the hi
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Distribution of Actors Income - Inc
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Shrimp Large (galda and bagda) The
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Majhis/Beparis (9.5 %), Choto Mahaj
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of value chains, in terms of return
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Service Centers and Financial Suppo
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those leased-out canals. There shou
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Infrastructure of web-cam through o
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Study Back
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Although the resource users are bla
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advocates of conservation in return
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1.4.1 Principal Tools Briefly, the
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Shrimps have been divided into four
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In the process of our consultations
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The value chain framework, which is
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The study carries out micro level a
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an idea about possible market power
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Table 1.4: Usual harvest time of SR
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others, occupational pattern, incom
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Chapter 2: SIZ District and Upazila
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Map 2.2: Map of SIZ Districts: Khul
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Table 2.2: Proportion of SIZ area a
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SIZ 58 55.7 93 44.5 5 25 Districts
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Figure 2.5: Per capita district GDP
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Figure 2.7: SIZ per capita lands by
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CHAPTER 3 FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY
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Satkhira 60 25.3 Pirojpur 11 4.6 Ba
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Retailer 107.2 30.2 All 87.5 48.7 F
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Like in other harvests, some of the
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Aratdars (11.6%) and Farias/Beparis
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Table 3.13: Distance of harvest pla
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Hantal 1.0 16.0 1.0 1.0 19.0 All 1.
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8.Unemployed 7.Self-employed 6.Cons
Page 113 and 114: Table 3.19: Repayment mode in SRF t
Page 115 and 116: In spite of the above, dadon is pre
Page 117 and 118: Incidence of pests 8.9 24.9 48.1 7.
Page 119 and 120: • Set up hand-driven tube-well at
Page 121 and 122: 3.5 Historical Moratorium on SRF Pr
Page 123 and 124: Chandpai .15* - 1.62** .16* .17* .1
Page 125 and 126: CHAPTER 4 MAPPING FOR CORE STEPS AN
Page 127 and 128: Table 4.1: Sectors and products und
Page 129 and 130: We start with timber 4.3.1 Timber -
Page 131 and 132: 4.3.3 Fish The fish sector consists
Page 134 and 135: Shrimp (Galda and Bagda) Chain 1: F
Page 136 and 137: Flow chart 4.8: Value chain for Cra
Page 138 and 139: Average number of boats involved in
Page 140 and 141: ola Khulna 1019 200 58 31 10 2 12 1
Page 142 and 143: year. On the assumption that one ac
Page 144 and 145: 600 569 000 no. 500 400 300 200 225
Page 146 and 147: Table 4.11: Proportions of SRF prod
Page 148 and 149: Figure 4.7: Volume of products (%)
Page 150 and 151: Chapter 5: Value Chain Analysis for
Page 152 and 153: Beparis sell, in addition to Choto
Page 154 and 155: Volume of trade The price value add
Page 156 and 157: 5.2.2 Gura Fish As large network of
Page 158 and 159: 140 Gura fish selling price (Tk per
Page 160 and 161: A specific group of people having g
Page 162 and 163: Sada fish gross return (monthly) by
Page 166 and 167: Figure 5.17: Hilsha gross return (T
Page 168 and 169: Gross returns and net returns Aratd
Page 170 and 171: Figure 5.23: Shrimp galda large net
Page 172 and 173: Figure 5.25: Shrimp bagda large sel
Page 174 and 175: Table 5.7: Value addition and retur
Page 176 and 177: Figure 5.31: Shrimp galda small net
Page 178 and 179: Figure 5.36: Shrimp bagda small val
Page 180 and 181: Average selling Price/piece Price V
Page 182 and 183: Figure 5.40: Shrimp fry galda value
Page 184 and 185: Shrimp fry bagda value addition (%)
Page 186 and 187: Crab gross return (monthly) by acto
Page 188 and 189: Note: See note under Table 5.1. (10
Page 190 and 191: Honey net return (monthly) by actor
Page 192 and 193: The degree of inequality is quite h
Page 194 and 195: Cumulative income share (%) 100 80
Page 196 and 197: Figure 5.59: Lorenz curve: Gura fis
Page 198 and 199: Decile 8 14.6 Decile 9 17.9 Decile
Page 200 and 201: Annual income level (%) of SRF Acto
Page 202 and 203: Actors Monthly income Duration (Mon
Page 204 and 205: Table 5.24: Annual income level of
Page 206 and 207: Annual income level (%) of SRF Acto
Page 208 and 209: anking actors, it can be seen that
Page 210 and 211: In terms of distribution by deciles
Page 212 and 213: Table 5.32: Annual income level of
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Decile 3 2.9 Decile 4 3.9 Decile 5
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PO
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actors community). Our survey findi
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The foremost policy, therefore, wil
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nets” to the collectors, along wi
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empowerment, awareness and overall
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of co-management. That co-managemen
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SRF collectors as a major problem o
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the problem as very high is more th
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Bernacsek, G. and E. Haque (2001).
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Kleih Ulrich (2003). “Fish Distri
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INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREA CO-MANAGEMENT (IPAC) - BIDS

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