INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREA CO-MANAGEMENT (IPAC) - BIDS

The basic structure of marketing chains for SRF products is shown in Figure 1.1. However, the
actual marketing chains are found to follow multi-dimensional patterns (Annex C).
As mentioned earlier, the theme of the present study is to map the monetary value throughout
the chain. In other words, our ultimate output would look like something involving the following
steps (Figure 1.2):
Figure 1.2: A simplified and typical SRF marketing system and value chain of the actors (% of
retail price)
Collector Faria/Bepari Choto
Boro
Aratdar Wholesaler
Mahajan Mahajan
Retailer
VA = ?
C = ?
M = ?
VA = ?
C = ?
M = ?
VA = ?
C = ?
M = ?
VA = ?
C = ?
M = ?
VA = ?
C = ?
M = ?
VA = ?
C = ?
M = ?
VA = ?
C = ?
M = ?
VA = Value addition; C = costs; M = Margin = VA – C
1.4.6 Characteristics of SRF Actors and Plausible Hypotheses regarding the
Value Chain
The study aims to track the various channels of SRF product marketing and the agents
involved. As will be evident later, the marketing and distribution system of major SRF
products follow a complex system in a unique economic zone. For many of the items, which
are dependent to some extent on FD rules and regulations, the number and type of major
intermediaries (e.g., Mahajans and Aratdars) are rather limited, allowing for oligopolistic
behavior to carry out such activities. The complex pattern of markets of SRF items in
Bangladesh makes the market operation interesting and critical. In this backdrop, concerns with
regard to resource control of the leading powerful agents, musclemen and intermediaries are
strongly voiced from time to time, however, often without adequate proof. The market power (in
terms of share of particular player in total supply) is also reported to be concentrated in the
hands of a few powerful players (See, for example, Rahman 2007). On the other hand, the
bargaining power of disadvantaged group (e.g., harvesters) is critically low for various factors.
This may give rise to the possibility of inequity and anti-competitive behavior (for example,
price manipulation, ownership of productive resources and control of supply in the market,
earning extraordinary profit) through a well-coordinated oligopolistic behavior. The present
study is an attempt to examine the relevant issues in this context.
Within a complex system, it is hypothesized that the number of important and powerful
players in the marketing and distribution system of SRF goods is limited who can exert the
major control over the productive resources allowing for oligopolistic behavior to carry out
such activities 39 . In other words, it is hypothesized that such network of powerful actors
creates unequal income distribution among SIZ populations through widespread exploitations.
1.4.7 Methodological Issues relating to Estimation Procedures
39 See Rahman (2007) for a similar hypothesis.
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