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218 Z. Zhang First, further credible energy-conservation commitments starting 2013 China has already committed itself to quantified targets on energy conservation and the use of clean energy. It needs to extend its level of ambition, further making credible quantified domestic commitments in these areas for the second commitment period. Such commitments would include but are not limited to continuing to set energysaving and pollutant control goals in the subsequent national five-year economic blueprints as challenging as the current 11th 5-year blueprint does, increasing investment in energy conservation and improving energy efficiency, significantly scaling up the use of renewable energies and other low-carbon technologies, in particular wind power and nuclear power, and doubling or even quadrupling the current unit capacity below which thousands of small, inefficient coal-fired plants need to be decommissioned (Zhang 2009c). Second, voluntary “no lose” emissions targets starting 2018 During this transition period, China could commit to adopting voluntary emission reduction targets. Emissions reductions achieved beyond these “no lose” targets would then be eligible for sale through carbon trading at the same world market price as those of developed countries whose emissions are capped, relative to the lower prices that China currently receives for carbon credits generated from clean development mechanism projects, meaning that China would suffer no net economic loss by adhering to the targets. Third, binding carbon intensity targets starting 2023, leading to emissions caps around 2030 While China is expected to adopt the carbon intensity target as a domestic commitment in 2011, China adopting binding carbon intensity targets in 2023 as its international commitment would be a significant step towards committing to absolute emissions caps during the subsequent commitment period. At that juncture, having been granted three transition periods, China could then be expected to take on binding emissions caps, starting around 2030 and to aim for the global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050. 4.2 A clear need within a climate regime to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation While indicating, well in advance, that it will take on absolute emissions caps around the year 2030, being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures, China should make the best use of the forums provided under the UNFCCC and its KP to effectively deal with the proposed measures to its advantage (Zhang 2009b). However, China and other leading developing countries appear to be comfortable with WTO rules and institutions defending their interests in any dispute that may arise over unilateral trade measures. Top Chinese official in charge of climate issues and the Brazilian climate ambassador consider the WTO as the proper forum when developing countries are required to purchase emission allowances in the U.S. proposed cap-and-trade regime (Samuelsohn 2007). This is reinforced in the Political Declaration of the Leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (the socalled G5) in Sapporo, Japan, July 8, 2008 that “in the negotiations under the Bali Road Map, we urge the international community to focus on the core climate change
The U.S. proposed carbon tariffs, WTO scrutiny and China’s responses 219 issues rather than inappropriate issues like competitiveness and trade protection measures which are being dealt with in other forums.” China may fear that the discussion on these no core issues will overshadow those core issues mandated under the Bali Action Plan (BAP). However, in my view, defining comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation within a climate regime is critical to addressing carbon tariffs of far-reaching implications. The BAP calls for “comparability of efforts” towards climate mitigation actions only among industrialized countries. However, lack of the clearly defined notion of what is comparable has led to diverse interpretations of the concept of comparability. Moreover, there is no equivalent language in the BAP to ensure that developing country actions, whatever might be agreed to at Copenhagen or later, are comparable to those of developed countries. So, some industrialized countries, if not all, have extended the scope of its application beyond industrialized countries themselves, and are considering the term “comparable” as the standard by which to assess the efforts made by all their trading partners in order to decide on whether to impose unilateral trade measures to address their own competitiveness concerns. Such lack of the common understanding will lead each country to define whether other countries have made comparative efforts to its own. This can hardly be objective, and in turn may lead one country to misuse unilateral trade measures against other trading partners to address its own competitiveness concerns. This is not hypothetical. Rather, it is very real as the Lieberman-Warner bill in the U.S. Senate and the Waxman-Markey bill in the U.S. House demonstrated. If such measures became law and were implemented, trading partners might choose to challenge U.S. before WTO. If a case like this is brought before a WTO panel, that panel would likely look to the UNFCCC for guidance on an appropriate standard for the comparability of climate efforts to assess whether the accused country has followed the international standard when determining comparability, as preceded in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute where the WTO Appellate Body considered the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (WTO 1998). Otherwise, that WTO panel will have no choice but to fall back on the aforementioned Shrimp-Turtle jurisprudence (see Box 2), and would be influenced by the fear of the political fall out from overturning U.S. unilateral trade measures in its domestic climate legislation. If the U.S. measures were allowed to stand, not only China would suffer, but it would also undermine the UNFCCC’s legitimacy in setting and distributing climate commitments between its parties (Werksman and Houser 2008). Therefore, as strongly emphasized in my interview in the New York Times (Reuters 2009), rather than reliance solely on WTO, there is a clear need within a climate regime to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level, taking into account differences in their national circumstances, such as current level of development, per capita GDP, current and historical emissions, emission intensity, and per capita emissions. If well defined, that will provide some reference to WTO panels in examining cases related to comparability issues. Indeed, defining the comparability of climate efforts can be to China’s advantage. China has repeatedly emphasized that it has taken many climate mitigation efforts. No country denies that, but at most China has received limited appreciation of its
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154 P.J.J. Welfens et al. Keywords
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344 C. Lutz 1 Introduction This cha
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348 C. Lutz is designed to reduce g
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352 C. Lutz Table 2 EU27 productivi
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358 T. Machiba While industries are
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