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have the physical support <strong>of</strong> the United States by every possible military and<br />

naval assistance we could bring to bear." (Langer, Op. Cit., p.210)<br />

Langer concluded on the whole affair by saying: "Ostensibly de<br />

Gaulle had scored a resounding success, but he had forgotten the old<br />

diplomatic adage that it is dangerous to play little tricks on great powers.<br />

Prior to the St. <strong>Pierre</strong>-Miquelon affair, our government had had little to do<br />

with de Gaulle and the Free French <strong>movement</strong> and had shown little interest<br />

in it." (Langer, Op. Cit., p.221) Then after playing down the popularity <strong>of</strong> de<br />

Gaulle inside <strong>of</strong> France, as well as playing down public opinion in the U.S.,<br />

Langer comes to the conclusion, which is also the conclusion <strong>of</strong> his entire<br />

<strong>book</strong>:<br />

"There was no convincing evidence that de Gaulle and his followers<br />

had many adherents in France, and even if there had been, we were bound to<br />

regulate our attitude toward the Free French in accordance with our policy<br />

toward Vichy. This government was convinced that the national interest<br />

would be best served by maintaining good relations with Petain's<br />

government. Once that is recognized, it is easy enough to understand that we<br />

could not cultivate de Gaulle. After the St. <strong>Pierre</strong>-Miquelon affair, relations<br />

naturally became worse. It was perfectly obvious that de Gaulle personally<br />

had been chiefly responsible for what looked like a cheap parlor trick. He<br />

had put the United States in a most embarrassing position, and had thereby<br />

built up resentment in <strong>of</strong>ficial circles that it was almost impossible to<br />

overcome. " (Langer, Op. Cit., p. 221)<br />

Though there is a resonance <strong>of</strong> naiveté in Langer's reasoning, his<br />

position is basically sound, and was credible enough to last the entire<br />

duration <strong>of</strong> the war. Again, the lesson to be learned is another case <strong>of</strong><br />

{involuntary deception} which permits the U.S. to continue playing its role<br />

<strong>of</strong> {diplomatic resistance} until the right time had come to back up the Free<br />

France <strong>of</strong> de Gaulle. An exceptionally clear view <strong>of</strong> that reality was<br />

expressed by Anne O'Hare McCormick <strong>of</strong> the {New York Times} <strong>of</strong> January<br />

7, 1942, who, while applauding the action <strong>of</strong> Charles de Gaulle, presented<br />

the truth <strong>of</strong> the matter, in an exceptionally knowledgeable way. She wrote:<br />

"Whether our policy toward France has been wise will be proved by<br />

events. It is a considered policy, however, patiently followed in the face <strong>of</strong><br />

opposition, and fully understood by the Free French as well as the British. It<br />

may be argued that our entry into the war changes our relation to the 'United<br />

127

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