synarchy movement of empire book ii - Pierre Beaudry's Galactic ...

7.2 HOW THE BATTLE OF FLANDERS WAS RIGGED.
First of all, the defensive reserves of the MAGINOT LINE were never
put into action. Day and night, the French soldiers of the MAGINOT LINE
could hear the rumble of the German tanks that were just bypassing them at
SEDAN and could not do anything about it. The Army on the Belgium front
was given faulty anti-tank guns. The DUFFIEUX report showed, after the
war, that parts were missing for the anti-tank guns and that the only
complete anti-tank guns armament on the soil of France were in reserve, and
would later be given to the Germans, without having served even once for
practice shooting. No French Tanks were permitted to intervene in time.
The artillery shells sent to the front lines were of the wrong caliber. The
French Air Force stayed on the ground and was never deployed. On June 25,
1940, 1,700 brand new Fighter Airplanes were located in the south of France
and remained there never to fly. It was later reported that those planes had
been kept in the south in order to stop a potential post war counterrevolution.
Most of the Officers and NCO'S of this southern French Air
Force group belonged to the extreme right.
GENERAL HUNTZIGER, who was located near SEDAN, and who
knew the time of the German invasion, failed to warn the officer responsible
for the defense of SEDAN, GENERAL ANDRE CORAP. The fortifications
had been dismantled under his orders, and the communication between the
two Army groups was not secured, leaving an open region for the German
Panzer Divisions to roll west toward LAON, and north toward SAINT-
QUENTIN-CHARLEVILLE, and the MEUSE RIVER, cutting off the
French and allied troops. This was the weakest point in the entire chain of
command, coordinated between GENERAL HUNTZIGER and GENERAL
GEORGE, within the other offices of the G.Q.G. headquarters. The
malfunctioning of communication between the different headquarters of the
High Command of the front lines represented the most important sabotage of
all. This alone was sufficient to guarantee the complete defeat.
To cite only one example of sabotage at the lower level of command,
a Lieutenant of the First Bureau of the G.Q.G., under GENERAL GEORGE,
noted, at the end of 1939, that the Headquarters had not followed up on
requests coming from the front lines. He considered this flaw serious enough
to warn his commander COLONEL DRAMARD, who told him: "Leave that
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