synarchy movement of empire book ii - Pierre Beaudry's Galactic ...

A the beginning of World War I, the military doctrine began to
change within the high command of the French Army. The training was
oriented on an all-out offensive, and the synarchists were preaching the
virtues of the "Young Turk" policy, which was called the {offensive a
outrance} (constant offensive), a form of attack that generally ended with a
bayonet charge. The new military doctrine was based on the insane idea that
{To win you have to advance}, which itself was a carbon copy of the
looting policy of bankers that said {If you don't gain you lose}. This was
even made popular in the well publicized theory of the French philosopher,
Henry Bergson, of the {elan vital} that served to prove that the French
soldier was superior to the German soldier, because of his {furia francesca}
(French fury) as it was called. The more serious officer, however, cautioned
against an all-out offensive that could result in too prohibitive loss of life,
and the ultimate loss of the war.
In the War College at the turn of the century, there was a dissenting voice
from an infantry officer, Colonel Henry Philippe Petain, who was teaching
that the offensive should be decided on the basis of the ratio of firepower,
largely determined to be three to one. This defensive only policy earned
Petain the reputation of being a "defeatist." Petain was commanding the 33 rd
Infantry Regiment, which the young Lieutenant Charles de Gaulle had
served under, after his graduation at Saint-Cyr, in 1912. (The fascist
government that was later established in Vichy, on July 10, 1940, was not
really run by Marshal Petain. It was in reality the beast-man Laval who ran
the government behind the senile and pessimistic octogenarian Marshal. De
Gaulle had nothing but disdain for the treason of Laval, and nothing but pity
for the false glory of Petain. De Gaulle said of Petain that he decided to
sacrifice France out of ambition for power. De Gaulle wrote: "Now
suddenly, in the extreme winter of his life, events offered to his gifts and to
his pride the occasion - so long awaited! - to bloom again without limits: on
one condition however, that he accept the disaster as the steppingstone to his
elevation and decorate it with his glory." {The Complete War Memoirs of
Charles de Gaulle}. p.60)
The all-out offensive policy had been advocated, artificially based on
the terrain and revenge policy of taking back the territories of Alsace and
Lorraine, which had been lost to the Germans in the war of 1870. The truth
of the matter is that the policy of recapturing Alsace and Lorraine was used
as a smoke screen for the traditional imperial French policy of the New
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