synarchy movement of empire book ii - Pierre Beaudry's Galactic ...

On July 3, 1940 the British Admiralty, under the "hateful decision" of
Churchill, surprised the French fleet sitting at Mers-El-Kebir, in Algeria,
seized the ships, ordered the sleepy crew ashore. "Within one hour,"
reported Shire, "all French warships in the British Isles were firmly in the
hands of the British navy and by the day's end their crews were on land,
momentarily interned, but given the choice of rallying to General de Gaulle's
free French forces, or being sent home. Not many rallied to the general…
only some 900 sailors, few of them officers, responded. All the rest, some
19,000 officers and men, chose repatriation to German-controlled France."
(Shirer, p.913.)
It was clear to the allies that if the French fleet were not neutralized,
the French fleet would have to be destroyed. There was no choice about this
ultimatum. There was no room for sentimentality or false pride before such a
decision. Churchill had worded his proposal in a very careful way, so as to
leave no room for irrational reaction. He offered three alternatives:
"{1- Sail with us and continue to fight for victory against the Germans
and the Italians.
2- Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port…
3- Sail with us…to some French port in the West Indies -
Martinique for instance…or perhaps the United States…
If you refuse these fair offers, I must, with profound regret,
require you to sink your ships within six hours. Failing that, I
have the orders…to use whatever force may be necessary to
prevent your ships from falling into German or Italian hands.}"
(Shirer, p.914)
Admiral Gensoul immediately responded rashly without mentioning
the three options, and he radioed the French Admiralty saying that he had
received from the British Admiralty the ultimatum: "{Sink your ships within
six hours or we shall use force to make you. My response: Force will be met
by force.}" When after the war, Gensoul was questioned before the
Parliamentary Investigating Committee, as to why he had not mentioned the
three alternatives to sinking the fleet, he responded: "I realized that if I had
accepted them, it would have ruptured the armistice agreement." This
response shows how far the situation had deteriorated, in only a few weeks,
when naval commanding officers were more concerned about keeping their
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