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Safety Matters - Rail, Tram and Bus Union of NSW

Safety Matters - Rail, Tram and Bus Union of NSW

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Systematic Management <strong>of</strong> OHS<br />

This Section <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Safety</strong> <strong>Matters</strong> Guide looks at overall monitoring <strong>and</strong><br />

systematic management <strong>of</strong> OHS issues. This Section outlines some <strong>of</strong><br />

the main principles <strong>and</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> effective OHS management<br />

systems. It is intended that additional material will be added to this Section that<br />

are relevant to particular workplaces or that address new industry initiatives<br />

<strong>and</strong> developments.<br />

SECTION TWO<br />

<strong>Safety</strong> <strong>Matters</strong> A Guide for Workplace OHS Representatives<br />

The Waterfall train crash <strong>and</strong> subsequent Inquiry finding provide a graphic<br />

example <strong>of</strong> the consequences <strong>of</strong> failing to systematically manage OHS. As the<br />

Waterfall Inquiry Interim report made clear that tragedy was a result <strong>of</strong> systemic<br />

failures in capital equipment, inadequate training, fatigue <strong>and</strong> inadequate<br />

medical care <strong>of</strong> frontline staff performing safety critical work.<br />

Waterfall Inquiry Findings<br />

The findings <strong>of</strong> the Waterfall Inquiry were particularly critical at the<br />

systemic failure <strong>of</strong> State <strong>Rail</strong> to plan <strong>and</strong> manage safe operations. Amongst<br />

its conclusions on the factors which contributed to the accident are:<br />

(a) The failure <strong>of</strong> State <strong>Rail</strong> to manage the risk <strong>of</strong> a high speed roll-over<br />

(b) The deadman pedal was not fail-safe in either its design or operation<br />

(c) No adequate testing <strong>of</strong> the system was undertaken<br />

(d) No system was established to enable identification <strong>of</strong> safety hazards<br />

(e) No system <strong>of</strong> accountability or responsibility for the safety devices<br />

installed on Tangara trains<br />

(f) No adequate assessment <strong>of</strong> the deficiencies in the safety system<br />

(ii) These failures were part <strong>of</strong> a ‘broader failure to properly manage<br />

safety in at least the following respects:<br />

(iii) There was a pervasive lack <strong>of</strong> safety awareness within the<br />

management <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>Rail</strong> Authority<br />

(iv) There was a culture which enabled safety violations to occur<br />

(v) There were no integrated system for communication <strong>of</strong> safety<br />

critical information<br />

(vi) There was a failure by State <strong>Rail</strong> to learn from other rail systems<br />

(vii) State <strong>Rail</strong> Authority failed to disclose information in its annual<br />

safety reports to the Department <strong>of</strong> Transport<br />

(viii) State rail Authority had a weak safety culture<br />

(ix) Approach <strong>of</strong> State <strong>Rail</strong> Authority to safety management was<br />

reactive<br />

RAIL<br />

Monitoring OHS Programs <strong>and</strong> Procedures<br />

14<br />

TRAM AND BUS<br />

U N<br />

I O N

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