the-evolution-of-international-security-studies

80 strategic studies, deterrence and the cold warIn addition to the pressures from rapidly evolving technologies, therewas an ongoing fundamental disagreement about the basic nature ofnuclear deterrence itself, and whether it was easy or difficult to achieve(Jervis, 1979/80; Gray, 1980; Lodal, 1980; Buzan, 1987a: 173–196). In partthis overlapped with the technology debates, but apart from assuming theexistence of deliverable nuclear weapons it was not heavily dependent ontheir details. Some thought that nuclear weapons made deterrence easy,because any even half-rational actor would be given extremely seriouspause by the prospect of obliteration. In other words, possession of anuclear arsenal sufficient for ‘assured destruction’ would basically suffice,leading to a so-called ‘minimum deterrence’ strategy. Others, taking amaximumdeterrenceapproach,calculatedthataruthlessrationalactor(as Kennan had postulated the Soviet Union to be) would require notonly a threat of high damage, but also a near certain probability thatsucharetaliationwouldbedelivered,beforedeterrencecouldbeeffective.Because of the ex ante ex post dilemma outlined above, providing ahigh certainty of retaliation under conditions of mutual deterrence wasdifficult. Logic might dictate that retaliating after being struck was anirrational act, thus opening the opportunity for the ruthless aggressor tothink about attacking in the first place.Minimum deterrence offered a kind of stability in easy parity, and alsoeconomy, but at the risk of vulnerability to utterly ruthless opponentsprepared to gamble in the face of huge threats to their own survival. Itslogic also provided incentives for so-called ‘horizontal’ nuclear proliferation(the spread of nuclear weapons to states not previously possessingthem), making it seem fairly straightforward for lesser powers to acquire agreat equaliser (Waltz, 1981). Bipolarity defined a nuclear club of two, andassociated nuclear weapons with superpower status. Britain, France andChina had, by the early 1960s, joined the nuclear club, obliging the twosuperpowers to assert their difference by acquiring much bigger nucleararsenals than the new arrivals. One of the few things the US and theSoviet Union agreed on was that they did not want additional nuclearpowers. This concern was initially focused on other industrialised states,particularly Germany and Japan, but during the 1970s shifted more toThird World states such as Argentina, Brazil and India, and also to Israeland the Middle East, and South Africa. Any horizontal proliferation notonly questioned the superpowers’ status, and complicated their optionsfor military interventions, but also raised the risk of nuclear war, whetherintentional or accidental. In what became the leading example of superpowercooperation during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union led