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the technological imperative 173(van Ham, 1993; Gardner, 1994), but also a stab at theory (Ogilvie-White,1996). Concern about the link between civil nuclear power and the potentialfor nuclear weapons remained an ongoing theme (Dauvergne, 1993;Perkovich, 1993a; Kokoski, 1996; Yamanouchi, 1997; Harrison, 1998),as was missile proliferation (Frye, 1992; Harvey, 1992; Pedatzur, 1994).The debate opened by Waltz about whether or not nuclear proliferationwas a good or bad thing also continued (Lee, 1995; Sagan and Waltz,1995; Thayer, 1995b; Feaver, 1997), as did that about why states wantnuclear weapons (Sagan, 1996/7) and the linkage between the ongoingpossession of nuclear weapons by some states (substantial cuts in nucleararsenals post-Cold War notwithstanding) and the dynamics of proliferationin non-nuclear weapon states (Quinlan, 1993). Although certainlynot absent from the Cold War literature, there was more of a tone ofpessimism in much of this literature, with some authors assuming theerosion of the non-proliferation regime and moving to think about thenature of a proliferated world (Feaver, 1992/3; van Creveld, 1993; Karl,1996/7; Posen, 1997; Preston, 1997; Delpech, 1998/9; Thakur, 2000). Asthe history of this subject lengthened, there was also the beginnings ofattempts to apply the lessons of history to the new proliferants (Blightand Welch, 1995). Against this pessimism there was some good news inthe abandonment of nuclear weapons in South Africa and the windingdown of apparent nuclear weapons programmes in Brazil and Argentina(Spector, 1992; Howlett and Simpson, 1993).Notable new themes were the perceived threats and problems fromnew nuclear weapon states (Deutch, 1992; Karl, 1996/7; Preston, 1997;Glaser, 1998), including the spreading problem of increasing numbersof states with short or very short lead times separating them from apossible shift from non-nuclear to nuclear weapon status (Fortmann,1992/3; Mazarr, 1995a; Cohen and Pilat, 1998). Some of this literatureblended proliferation with issues of deterrence (Feaver, 1992/3; Sagan,1994; Joseph and Reichart, 1998) so, along with Israel, rescuing that topicfrom near oblivion. There was concern about the pros and cons of theUS shift from the non-proliferation policy of the Cold War to a moreunilateralist and potentially military anti-proliferation policy (Roberts,1993; Schneider, 1994; Feaver and Niou, 1996; Joseph, 1996; Kristensenand Handler, 1996; Posen, 1997; Andreani, 1999/2000). There was alsoincreased focus on terrorism, not just with nuclear weapons, but also,especially given the advances in biological technology, with other weaponsof mass destruction (WMD) (Failey, 1995; Tucker, 1996, 1999, 2000;Steinbruner, 1997/8; Betts, 1998; Carter et al., 1998; Falkenrath, 1998,2001; Survival, 1998/9).