the-evolution-of-international-security-studies

traditionalist iss post-9/11 239there was some interest in Russia’s reactions to both NATO developmentsand US hegemony more generally (Monaghan, 2006; White et al., 2006;Sakwa, 2008). As this book goes to press, it seems a reliable predictionthat Russia’s more assertive foreign policy will increase discussion of it inthe ISS literature.The third key part in this reconsideration of global polarity was theEU. If the EU was becoming a pole of power in world politics, or evena superpower, then this was both a parallel development to the rise ofChina, and a complement to the widening Atlantic being driven by theunilateralist turn in US policy. Against the background of the EU’s ratherfeeble performance as a security actor, there was still a surprising amountof interest in the idea from the 1990s debates of the EU as a comingsuperpower (Guttman, 2001; Rotfeld, 2001; Kupchan, 2003; Buzan, 2004a;McCormick, 2006; Yeilada et al., 2006). The main focus, however, was lessambitious, looking at the military–political capability of the EU, 14 andits attempt to find a more coherent security and defence policy. 15 Sidethemes included the security implications of the EU’s eastern enlargement(Higashino, 2004; O’Brennan, 2006), the strategic relations of the EU withRussia (Averre, 2005; Giegerich et al., 2006) and the implications of EUsecurity developments for NATO (Peters, 2004; Whitman, 2004). 9/11 andthe GWoT made little impact on this discussion, which was mainly drivenby developments, or the lack of them, in the EU’s internal structures, andby enlargement.Technology has been the other main driving force for traditionalistISS and, like great power politics, it remained important. This side ofthe ISS literature maintained a very similar overall structure of debateto that in the 1990s. Under its key headings of BMD, RMA, deterrence,proliferation, arms racing and arms control there was mainly continuity.The key difference that the GWoT made was to further boost the concernabout rogue states, strengthening the linking of debates about nuclearproliferation and debates about deterrence that was already becomingevident during the 1990s. The GWoT of course amplified concerns aboutthe proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD, but it creatednothing like the obsession with military technology that had marked theCold War. One of the curious twists of 9/11 was the way it put emphasis14 Ortega, 2001; Hagman, 2002; Salmon and Shepherd, 2003; Giegerich and Wallace, 2004;Kupchan, 2004/5.15 Hunter, 2002; Webber et al., 2002; Youngs, 2002; Jones, 2003; Becher, 2004; Menon, 2004;Cornish and Edwards, 2005; Smith et al., 2005; Hills, 2006; Jones, 2006; Posen, 2006;Salmon, 2006; Kaldor et al., 2007; Bailes, 2008.