the-evolution-of-international-security-studies

266 conclusionsthese will remain in play. It would be a step too far at this late stage in thebook to speculate about whether the basic framing of the driving forcesmight itself change. The scope for such change can, however, be indicatedjust by thinking about the implications of democratic peace theory. If allof the great powers were liberal democracies, and if this theory provedcorrect in its core prediction that democracies do not go to war witheach other, then the great power variable as it has played throughoutthis study would be either removed or transformed. Similarly, if thosearguing that world government is not nearly so remote a possibility ascommonly thought (Wendt, 2003; Deudney, 2007) turn out to be correct,then many of the Realist assumptions underpinning much of ISS woulddisappear. However interesting it might be to go down this route, wewill forbear. But we cannot resist ending with a little speculative foraybased on the assumption that our five driving forces remain in operation.Given current trends and developments, what sorts of pressures mightthey generate that would (re)shape the further evolution of ISS in thecoming decades?Great power politicsEven if democratic peace theory eventually eliminates this category it willnot do so for some time, and may not do so at all. Within that room fordoubt lie two partly linked developments that could significantly reshapeISS.First is the ‘rise of China’ already extensively discussed. The simple versionof this is that a big (non-democratic) state rises to superpower statuson the basis of its growing material capability and returns the internationalsystem to a bipolar structure. In the Neorealist view, China and theUS must then become rivals, including military rivals, with the result that,among other things, the traditional agenda within ISS returns more tocentre-stage. Much can be interpreted as pointing in this direction, fromSino–US rivalry in space to concerns about Chinese influence in Africaand other places. If the rise of China became widely seen as threateningto the capitalist world in the way that the Soviet Union was, then thisscenario is plausible.But there is also much that argues for the rise of China not beingseen as threatening, either by its neighbours or by much of the restof the world, including Europe. China’s adoption of capitalism, and itsintegration into the world economy, its ‘peaceful rise’ strategy, and itsmoderate behaviour in many international institutions provide room