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traditionalist iss post-9/11 241specifically. 17 There was even a bit <strong>of</strong> history on <strong>the</strong> nuclear taboo (Tannenwald,2005). The nuclear policies <strong>of</strong> Britain and France continued toattract a surprising amount <strong>of</strong> interest, <strong>the</strong> former because <strong>of</strong> debatesabout renewing (or not) <strong>the</strong> small but expensive fleet <strong>of</strong> ballistic missilecarrying submarines. 18 Less surprising, given <strong>the</strong> concerns about proliferation,was <strong>the</strong> interest in <strong>the</strong> deterrence logic <strong>of</strong> small/new nucleararsenals (Goldstein, 2003; Ghosh, 2004), and nuclear weapons as a wayfor rogue states such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran to deter <strong>the</strong> US fromthreatening <strong>the</strong>m with regime change (D. D. Smith, 2006). The impact <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> GWoT was visible in a new concern with deterring non-state actors(Auerswald, 2006).As during <strong>the</strong> 1990s, horizontal proliferation <strong>of</strong> WMD was <strong>the</strong> centralconcern driven by technology. The links to deterrence and BMD havebeen noted immediately above, and <strong>the</strong> link to <strong>the</strong> post-9/11 concernwith terrorism noted in <strong>the</strong> discussion under events at <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong>this chapter. Although worries about terrorism infused and reinforced<strong>the</strong> general agenda <strong>of</strong> nuclear proliferation, <strong>the</strong>y did not change <strong>the</strong>overall shape and direction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> literature, which had already undergonea turn towards rogue states. A more formalised sense now emerged<strong>of</strong> a so-called ‘second nuclear age’ (Cha, 2001; Schmitt, 2001; Bracken,2003; Gavin, 2004), in which a new wave <strong>of</strong> mainly Third World stateswas acquiring nuclear weapons. These developments provided fuel for<strong>the</strong> long-established debates between optimists and pessimists about <strong>the</strong>effects <strong>of</strong> nuclear proliferation (Woods, 2002; Knopf, 2003; Asal andBeardsley, 2007; Rendall, 2007; Singer, 2007). Ei<strong>the</strong>r way, along with <strong>the</strong>GWoT, this second nuclear age was clearly putting heavy pressure on <strong>the</strong>non-proliferation regime, and opened a substantial discussion about <strong>the</strong>opportunities and challenges for <strong>the</strong> existing components <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nonproliferationregime from <strong>the</strong> new wave <strong>of</strong> nuclear weapon and missileproliferation. 19 A whole issue <strong>of</strong> International Affairs (2007) was devotedto this topic. Within this debate, new initiatives such as <strong>the</strong> ‘proliferation<strong>security</strong> initiative’ (Cotton, 2005; Valencia, 2005) and o<strong>the</strong>r measures tocurb <strong>the</strong> trade in nuclear technology (Montgomery, 2005) also attractedattention. The existing debates about US counter-proliferation policies17 Butfoy, 2002; Ross, 2002; Russell and Wirtz, 2004; Yost, 2005a; Cimbala, 2006; Gormley,2006; Lieber and Press, 2006; Colby, 2007.18 On Britain: M. Clarke, 2004; Simpson, 2004; Yost, 2005a; Lewis, 2006; MccGwire, 2006;Quinlan, 2006; Stocker, 2007. On France: Simpson, 2004; Yost, 2005a, 2005b.19 Deibel, 2002; Levite, 2002/3; Mistry, 2003a, 2003b; Paul, 2003; Braun and Chyba, 2004;Gahlaut and Bertsch, 2004; D. D. Smith, 2006; Quinlan, 2007; O’Hanlon, 2008.

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