the-evolution-of-international-security-studies

traditionalist iss post-9/11 237posture made its strategy increasingly interesting in itself, 7 though theUS–Japan alliance remained the dominant framing, 8 not least becauseof its implications for China (Wang, 2003; Midford, 2004). Given therise of China, and signs of greater independence in Japan’s security policy,more consideration was given to Japan’s relations with Korea (Cha,2000a; Auslin, 2005). In this context, a long overdue development wasthe increase of interest in the relationship of Northeast Asia’s two greatpowers, China and Japan, which even through the 1990s had remainedmasked by Japan’s self-subordination to the US in security matters andrelations with China. 9 North Korea remained an abiding concern, 10 bothbecause of its implications for regional stability and because of the particularcrisis about its nuclear weapons programme (on which more below).Analysis of the implications of China’s rise also extended to the widercontext of its relationships with India and Russia (Garver, 2001; Sidhuand Yuan, 2003; Pant, 2004; Rangsimaporn, 2006; Ferdinand, 2007; Scott,2008).The debate about US grand strategy that had been a feature of thepost-Cold War decade not only continued unabated, but also diversifiedunder the impact of both 9/11 and the Bush administration’s more aggressiveforeign policy. 11 The 1990s debate had mainly focused around theemergence of a dominant view that unipolarity would be considerablymore than a transitional moment following the end of bipolarity. Post-9/11, the debate was more about the nature of the unipolar order, thoughsome remained sceptical about its durability (Layne, 2006) and there wassome interest in the political economy aspects of the subject (Caverley,2007; Stokes, 2007). Whether because of the particular impact of the Bushadministration and the GWoT, or whether because the Neorealists seemedto be correct in their prediction (if not in its timing or intensity) that aunipolar power structure would foment opposition, much of this debatewas about the weakening of the Atlantic community.7 Midford, 2002; Hughes, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2006; Lind, 2004; Inoguchi and Bacon, 2006;Arase, 2007; Hughes, 2007; Hughes and Krauss, 2007; Samuels, 2007/8.8 Oka, 2001; Ohtomo, 2002; Van Ness, 2002; Midford, 2003; Rowan, 2005; Yoda, 2006.9 Rozman, 2002a, 2002b; Reilly, 2004; Wan, 2004; Chiba and Xiang, 2005; Gries, 2005b;Roy, 2005; Tamamoto, 2005; Dreyer, 2006; Hsiung, 2007; Mochizuki, 2007.10 Kihl, 2002; Miles, 2002; Pinkston and Saunders, 2003; Rozman, 2003; Cha and Kang, 2005;Kerr, 2005; H. Smith, 2005; Michishita, 2006.11 Cronin, 2002; Hendrickson, 2002; Daalder and Lindsay, 2003; Jervis, 2003b, 2005; Layne,2003; Lobell, 2003; Posen, 2003; Dueck, 2003/4, 2004a, 2004b; Bacevich and Prodromou,2004; A. Newman, 2004; Dunn, 2005; Mastanduno, 2005; Calleo, 2007; Posen, 2007.