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the-evolution-of-international-security-studies

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100 strategic <strong>studies</strong>, deterrence and <strong>the</strong> cold war<strong>the</strong> ‘S-curve’ from <strong>the</strong> late 1970s onwards. But as we will show in chapter6, <strong>the</strong> winding down <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cold War did not take away an ongoingpreoccupation with new military technologies, and nei<strong>the</strong>r did it removeconcern about nuclear weapons. As <strong>the</strong> focus on superpower arsenalsreceded, that on horizontal proliferation became more prominent.As already noted, <strong>the</strong> ending <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cold War posed a possible crisis for<strong>the</strong> extremely successful institutionalisation <strong>of</strong> Strategic Studies, whichnow faced hard questions about its relevance, resourcing and bureaucraticsurvival on anything like its 1980s scale. It also derailed <strong>the</strong> internaldynamics <strong>of</strong> academic and policy debates. The 1980s intellectual drift<strong>of</strong> Strategic Studies into an unattractive choice between an existentialdeterrence dependent on irrationality, and a full-spectrum deterrencedependent on a sustained rationality so complex as to make its plausibilityquestionable, was simply swept away. With <strong>the</strong> Cold War gone, <strong>the</strong>sequestions became <strong>of</strong> only <strong>the</strong>oretical interest. And since Strategic Studieshad lived on its linkage to public policy questions, <strong>the</strong>oretical interest wasnot nearly enough to sustain engagement by <strong>the</strong> large establishment thathad grown up during <strong>the</strong> Cold War. Gone also was <strong>the</strong> whole problem<strong>of</strong> managing extended deterrence that had so much defined political andintellectual tensions across <strong>the</strong> Atlantic. With <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union disappearingas a threat, Europe no longer needed US protection. The problemwith NATO shifted from how to share <strong>the</strong> burdens and risks <strong>of</strong> extendeddeterrence to whe<strong>the</strong>r NATO was necessary at all, and if it was, <strong>the</strong>n forwhat?With <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cold War, Strategic Studies faced a crisis born <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> very success that its marriage to <strong>the</strong> superpower nuclear rivalry hadgiven it. Despite this crisis, it was <strong>the</strong> Cold War development <strong>of</strong> ISS that set<strong>the</strong> template for ‘<strong>international</strong> <strong>security</strong>’ to which all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contemporaryand subsequent wideners and deepeners had to relate. But before we lookat how ISS rose from <strong>the</strong> ashes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ending <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cold War, let us turnto <strong>the</strong> Cold War approaches which questioned Strategic Studies’ reading<strong>of</strong> nuclear deterrence, <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state, and <strong>the</strong> privilege accordedto state-centric, military <strong>security</strong>.

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