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116 the cold war challenge to national securityMarwah and Schulz, 1975; Walker, 1975; Schelling, 1976; Kapur, 1980a;Harkavy, 1981; Poneman, 1981; de Mesquita and Riker, 1982; Dewitt,1987; R. C. Karp, 1991). In addition, there was literature about missileproliferation (Hsieh, 1971; Karp, 1984/5, 1991; Navias, 1989; Potter andStulberg, 1990: Dunn, 1991), about the implications of proliferation fordeterrence and war (Berkowitz, 1982; de Mesquita and Riker, 1982; Kaiser,1989) and about the possibility of nuclear terrorism (Beres, 1979). TheSIPRI Yearbooks contained extensive annual updates on most aspects ofnuclear proliferation. Because the subject touched on so many aspects ofIR, from regime theory and technology, through North–South relationsand area studies, to Strategic Studies and Peace Research, its literaturewas published in a remarkable variety of journals. It was even possibleto teach whole courses on proliferation at universities, and some of thebooks were published with this in mind, as well as for a wider publicaudience (Beaton, 1966; Young, 1972).The subject gained some of its popularity because of concerns over thetechnological and political links between civil and military nuclear applications.Civil nuclear power was controversial in its own right. Becausethere were close connections between some key aspects of the technology(especially the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spentreactor fuel), this meant that there were economies of scale to be gainedin pursuing both civil and military nuclear power, as all of the earlynuclear weapon states, and later India, did. Civil nuclear power could notbe wholly insulated from military implications, and this fact was at theheart of the controversial Faustian bargain in the NPT (Greenwood et al.,1976; Camilleri, 1977, 1984; Wohlstetter et al., 1979: Lovins et al., 1980;Brenner, 1981: 1–93; Dorian and Spector, 1981). States that renouncednuclear weapons via the NPT won the right to have access to civil nucleartechnology, and that access could be used to prepare breakout options byshortening the lead time for making nuclear weapons.What came to be known generally as ‘the non-proliferation regime’was in fact composed of many different elements, and whether these werecomplementary or contradictory was one theme of the debates. At thecore of the regime were its two multilateral components: the NPT, and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which was responsible forthe system of safeguards (accounting, monitoring, inspection) built intothe NPT (Quester, 1970; Young, 1972: 82–135; Imber, 1980; Lodgaard,1980; Gummett, 1981; Dahlitz, 1984; Schiff, 1984; Fischer and Szasz,1985; Nye, 1985; Simpson, 1987; Smith, 1987; Tate, 1990). Although theNPT was aimed at being universal, and except for a few holdouts such