47.5 MB - The Whole Building Design Guide

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Perhaps the most serious consequence of the impeded access wasthe way it affected the evacuation of hospitals in New Orleans.Serious disruptions in hospital operations required immediateevacuation, which could not take place because the streets werenot accessible for up to 5 days. There was a critical need for ahelipad, either on the roof or an equivalent landing area on aparking structure, with emergency lighting for night operation.Elevated parking structures were a great asset, providing both aprotection for the vehicles and a convenient helicopter landingsite on the roof. They were especially useful if the parking structurehad an elevated pedestrian bridge to the hospital.4.2.5 Architectural DesignA typical hospital configuration is based on access requirementsthat usually place the emergency department on the first floorin order to receive walk-in patients or those brought in by ambulances.Clinical laboratory and imaging are frequently on thefirst floor as well, as are surgery and intensive care units in manysmaller hospitals. All of these are vital services in the event of anemergency and for providing routine patient care. Location onthe first floor frequently exposes them to additional risks fromnatural hazards, especially flooding, as became evident duringHurricane Katrina.Building configuration and general shape frequently contribute tohigh-wind damage. Protrusions and projections in walls and roofscause additional wind turbulence that increases uplift pressures.The penthouse at West Jefferson Medical Center illustrates thevulnerability of projections and corners to high winds (see Figure4-4). Large portions of metal cladding came loose because theywere not designed or constructed to resist these loads.Canopies, which most hospitals have over drop-off areas, are particularlysusceptible to uplift and other damage, if not designed toresist the loads (see Figure 4-5). Glass-enclosed lobbies and atria,common to many hospitals, also proved to be a hazard, becauseof the large areas of usually unprotected glazing that could easilyshatter under the impact of wind-borne debris. In many cases,these areas were closed during the storm, thereby cutting off amajor point of access to the hospitals.OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL FACILITIES4-9
Figure 4-4:Penthouse at the WestJefferson Medical CenterFigure 4-5:Canopy soffit damage atWest Jefferson MedicalCenterAt Louisiana State University Hospital, the emergency generatorsin the basement were flooded and shut down, which put theentire hospital out of commission. Similarly, all the major mechanicalequipment in Charity Hospital in New Orleans was in thebasement, including fifteen 5,000-watt emergency generators. Thehospital had to be evacuated soon after the basement flooded andthe emergency power supply failed. Touro Infirmary, however, hadthe emergency power generators located on the third floor. Thisallowed them to run most of the critical systems, including the4-10 OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL FACILITIES
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Risk Management SeriesDesign Guidef
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Any opinions, findings, conclusions
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ational during and after a major di
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TARGET AUDIENCEThis manual describe
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Appendix A contains a list of acron
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Forster, FEMA; David Godschalk, Uni
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Chapter 2- Making Critical faciliti
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2.4.6 Utility Installations .......
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4.4.8 Utility Plumbing Systems.....
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avoid them when feasible. In cases
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It then crossed Florida into the Gu
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Figure 1-2: Mississippi coast SLOSH
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isks for the facility at the propos
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m Appoint a building program manage
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-Figure 1-3: Process flow chart for
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hazards, usually refers to a buildi
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occurrence during a specified time
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ut is moderate overall. Some hazard
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words, the acceptable performance o
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prior to the onset of this level of
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1.4 REFERENCESAmerican Society of C
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MAKING CRITICAL FACILITIES SAFE FRO
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m Land subsidence, which increases
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valley or the presence of obstructi
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2.1.1.1 Probability of Occurrence o
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year, a very low probability flood
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m FIRMs and Flood Insurance Studies
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Figure 2-3: Riverine flood hazard z
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have been prepared by the U.S. Army
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ABFEs represent the best estimate o
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The following characteristics that
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Figure 2-7 shows the general relati
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2.1.2.5 Hydrodynamic LoadsWater flo
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stillwater depth) and that waves pr
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Debris velocity: The velocity of th
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The most convincing evidence of the
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2.1.3.2 Summary of the NFIP Minimum
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complished through a State permit,
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Developed through a consensus proce
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2.2 CRITICAL FACILITIES EXPOSED TOF
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listed includes health hazards, los
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overview on performance-based desig
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Figure 2-12:Katrina’s storm surge
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Buoyancy and uplift: If below-grade
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acceptable, depending on the type o
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Metal components: Metal structural
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Emergency power generators: Generat
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Office records and police files: Wh
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2.3 REQUIREMENTS AND BESTPRACTICES
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terior drainage (on the land side);
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Slab-on-grade foundation on structu
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and debris and ice impact loads. Fl
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are capable of withstanding direct
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pressure, hydrodynamic loads, wave
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may significantly reduce the certai
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2.3.2.1 Elevation ConsiderationsThe
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Figure 2-30:Flood hazard zones inco
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path when designing and specifying
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ular attention to underfloor utilit
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2.3.5.4 Storage Tank InstallationsA
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2.4.2 SITE MODIFICATIONSA plan to m
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Mobilized floodwall: This category
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methods used to move other types of
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Even if a facility is unlikely to s
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Wastewater system components become
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Emergency barriers are measures of
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2.5 CHECKLIST FOR BUILDINGVULNERABI
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Table 2-3: Checklist for Building V
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FEMA, Protecting Building Utilities
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MAKING CRITICAL FACILITIES SAFE FRO
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flow is typically 6,000 to 12,000 f
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Tornado: This is a violently rotati
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Figure 3-3: Design wind speeds for
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Exposure: The characteristics of th
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Internal pressure (building pressur
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Figure 3-7:Schematic of internalpre
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Figure 3-8: Relative roof uplift pr
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larities will normally be based on
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spread in both of those storms. Pri
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and subsequent progressive failure;
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3.2 CRITICAL FACILITIES EXPOSED TOH
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Wall coverings, soffits, and large
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oof panels were applied over metal
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3.2.2 Evaluating Critical Facilitie
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Step 2: Perform a field investigati
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3.3.1.1 SiteWhen selecting land for
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schools are required to be designed
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As part of the detailed design effo
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steel. FEMA Technical Bulletin, Cor
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a window submittal should show that
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and limited uplift resistance of de
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Figure 3-23:View looking down at th
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m For buildings that have mechanica
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sionals should also specify the att
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Figure 3-31:Door sill pan flashing
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Adjustable jamb/head weatherstrippi
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E 2112 provides guidance on the des
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Soffits: Depending on the wind dire
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mph, those used for hurricane shelt
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Figure 3-47:These four ties werenev
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m Install ties as the brick is laid
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At the hospital shown in Figure 3-5
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etween the hospital and the medical
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metal panels were attached with con
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avoid blow-off. Stainless steel or
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If the roof system is fully adhered
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Figure 3-60:View of the underside o
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ities. For FMG-insured facilities,
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Figure 3-65:The original modifiedbi
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Figure 3-66:If mechanically attache
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Loads and Attachment Methods 9Infor
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Fan cowling attachment: Fans are fr
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Condenser attachment: In lieu of pl
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Boiler and exhaust stack attachment
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Figure 3-78:Collapsed hospital ligh
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Figure 3-80:The antenna tower atthi
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Table 3-3: Risk Reduction Design Me
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Table 3-3: Risk Reduction Design Me
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Chapter 4 for information on the pe
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Figure 3-83:Open walkways donot pro
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ASTM E 1996 specifies five missile
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ASCE 7 refers to ASTM E 1996 for mi
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For interior non-load-bearing mason
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m For structural metal roofs, it is
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Mechanically attached and air-press
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Figure 3-92:To avoid walkway padblo
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3.4.4.2 Mechanical PenthousesBy pla
Page 264 and 265: To enhance the wind performance of
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Page 268 and 269: to power generation stations and by
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Page 272 and 273: Table 3-4: Recommendations for Desi
Page 274 and 275: Strong and violent tornadoes can ge
Page 276 and 277: For critical facilities located in
Page 278 and 279: Retrofitting a shelter space inside
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Page 282 and 283: Figure 3-106:The school’s built-u
Page 284 and 285: 3.6.2 Building EnvelopeThe followin
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Page 290 and 291: Figure 3-116:The edge nailer on top
Page 292 and 293: Figure 3-118:The antenna at thishos
Page 294 and 295: 3.7 Checklist for BuildingVulnerabi
Page 296 and 297: Table 3-8: Checklist for Building V
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Page 300 and 301: 3.8 References and Sources ofAdditi
Page 302 and 303: American Society for Testing and Ma
Page 304: FEMA, Attachment of Brick Veneer in
Page 307 and 308: accompanied with suggestions on pos
Page 309 and 310: Hurricane Katrina emphasized the fa
Page 311 and 312: The water supply was interrupted an
Page 313: Hancock Medical Center in Bay St. L
Page 317 and 318: Figure 4-6:Repair of EIFS wallcover
Page 319 and 320: The primary cause of window breakag
Page 321 and 322: West Jefferson Medical Center lost
Page 323 and 324: 4.2.8 Mechanical and ElectricalSyst
Page 325 and 326: covering the fill cap and all vent
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Page 329 and 330: mary and West Jefferson Medical Cen
Page 331 and 332: 4.3 EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES4.3.1 Bac
Page 333 and 334: 4.3.2 Effects of FloodingThe most d
Page 335 and 336: Figure 4-17:Broken windows atD’Ib
Page 337 and 338: St. Stanislaus High School in Bay S
Page 339 and 340: 4.3.6 Structural SystemsMost of the
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Page 343 and 344: Figure 4-27:Metal roof covering pee
Page 345 and 346: ment, especially HVAC systems, was
Page 347 and 348: Figure 4-30:Interior damage at Char
Page 349 and 350: m Doors should be designed to meet
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Page 353 and 354: 4.4.3 Effects of High WindsThe high
Page 355 and 356: Figure 4-33:Jackson County EOCFigur
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Page 359 and 360: Figure 4-37:Back Bay Fire Company#3
Page 361 and 362: Figure 4-39:Gulfport Fire Station #
Page 363 and 364: Third District Fire Station in New
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Figure 4-44:Roof damage at HancockC
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underground tank for toilets and wa
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Figure 4-47:Generator mounted atgra
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Figure 4-49:Broken communicationsma
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erate without adequate emergency po
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FISFMAFMGFMRHMGPIBCICCICULPSMEPSMOB
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Building, enclosed. A building that
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Floodway. The channel and that port
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OOpenings. Apertures or holes in th
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FEMA Mitigation ProgramscFederal fu
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Table 1: Side-by-Side of FEMA Progr
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todial care facilities (including t
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aged windows with impact-resistant
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tions, and wastewater treatment pla
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47.5 MB - The Whole Building Design Guide

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