The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Politburo would be unpredictable. Suslov and Ponomaryov would surely approve it, so it wasbetter not to voice any opinions now. Let these generals bask in their intelligence and wit. At themoment it was more appropriate for him to remain silent.Medyanik changed the topic. “Do you think that Khalq and Parcham really made peace witheach other? For any extended period of time? When they begin to divide portfolios in government,both factions will resume their squabbles. They will even possibly start killing each other.”“Too bad,” sighed Leonov. “It’s unfortunate that we couldn’t convince the CentralCommittee that the intelligence services shouldn’t deal with Afghan party politics, calm themdown, wipe away their snot.”Kryuchkov looked at his interlocutor with reproach and shook his head. Is he criticizingparty leadership? It was permitted to an extent within their circle, but one had to be careful ofcrossing the line. Although, in general, Leonov was correct. Why bother intelligence with theseissues? Khalqis, Parchamis—even their value as sources of political information was doubtful.There were never problems with obtaining information in Afghanistan. Highly placed governmentbureaucrats, heads of special services and the military, always willingly collaborated with Sovietintelligence. We had our agents even in the closest circle of the king, and then Daoud. These oldmen in the Central Committee—Ponomaryov, Ulyanovsky, Brutenz—were still thinking along thelines of Communist International, which was long gone. They would only trust intelligenceoperatives to transfer funds and instructions to “friends.” The intelligence services even had todeal with taking care of the personal affairs of Afghan party functionaries. The contacts of ouroperatives with members of the underground opposition party could be very dangerous. In anycountry, an accusation of involvement in covert anti-state actions could lead to severepunishment.116