The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

necessary to justify possible military intervention in Afghanistan.“This should be prepared in the format of a memorandum for the Central Committeeby tomorrow morning,” stated Gromyko harshly, looking above his colleagues’ heads.The subordinates, who were accustomed to Gromyko’s severe character,understood that it was better to not ask questions. However, his first deputy, Korniyenko,mustered the courage to ask if it was really true that the Politburo had decided to intervenemilitarily.“We have yet to reach such a decision. However, if the situation requires, we areprepared to intervene,” responded the minister slowly. “Under no circumstances can welose Afghanistan,” he repeated. “You must understand that if today we leave Afghanistan,tomorrow we will have to defend our borders from Muslim hordes somewhere inTajikistan or Uzbekistan.”***The next day, the same Politburo members reconvened. The chairman of thegovernment reported about his conversations with Taraki.“Per our agreement yesterday, I spoke twice with Comrade Taraki,” Kosygin beganhis detailed report. “He informed me that the situation in Herat is very complicated. Hisview is that if the Soviet Union does not assist now, they will be unable to maintain controlof the city. If Herat falls, they will lose everything. I asked him, ‘If you have a standing armyof 100,000 in Afghanistan now, why not form several divisions to deploy in Herat?’ Heexplained to me that by the time they form those divisions, there would be no garrisonloyal to the government left in Herat. Instead, they are asking us to send tanks and armoredvehicles to support them. Then I asked if they had enough tank drivers to operate those368