The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

emergence of the “gang of four.” This I have already mentioned. It’s just that theinformation from the disgraced Khalqis seems to have appeared at the right time.Now, I want to say something important. The issue of whether Amin was a CIA agentis akin to the question, “Do you believe in flying saucers?” One might say, “No, I don’tbelieve in them”; another might say, “Yes, I believe in them”; and a third might say, “Yes, Imet the aliens, and I flew with them to their planet.” For some it is an issue of faith, forothers, an issue of knowledge.The destruction of the regime of Hafizullah Amin (and Amin himself) didn’t happenbecause someone among the Soviet leadership suspected him of having ties with the CIA. Inpolitics, particularly in high politics, such a “small thing” as working for a foreignintelligence service is not taken into consideration very often. There are many examplesconfirming this in the history of our country, as well as the history of other states. TheSoviet leadership, beginning on July 17, 1973, when Mohammad Daoud came to power inAfghanistan, in accordance with the concept that had been developed by our politicaltheoreticians and specialists of the Orient, considered that only some kind of “united frontof progressive and patriotic forces” could overcome the advances of pro-imperialisticreaction in such a backward, medieval country. In connection with that concept, the Sovietleaders constantly attempted to impose on Daoud a union with the PDPA, and with somefake public organizations consisting of old intelligentsia, human rights activists,progressive clerics, and others. We wrote in great detail about Daoud’s reaction to this inour book.After the April Revolution, Moscow continued singing the same tune: “Comrades andrevolutionaries: do create a ‘front of progressive and patriotic forces’ as soon as possible.”729