The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

duration of the war in Afghanistan.According to the conditions put forward by President Zia ul-Haq, Americanassistance could not be sent to the rebels directly; it could only be provided throughPakistani Intelligence Services. Using ISI as an intermediary was much more costly becauseof the high levels of corruption in Pakistan and the fact that part of the assistance wouldinevitably remain in the ISI coffers. However, that model permitted the CIA to avoid directengagement on the ground.Meanwhile, CIA officers stationed in Kabul were instructed to monitor internalprocesses in the DRA even more closely, as well as the degree of involvement by the USSR,and to study the potential for the growing counter-revolution in the country.The rumor that Amin was an old CIA agent, which had been launched by Amin’senemies in the PDPA, reached the U.S. ambassador in early 1979. The ambassador wasintrigued and asked the CIA resident if that was indeed the case.“Unfortunately, such things happen only in Hollywood,” Turko burst into laughter.“It’s too good to be true.”“But maybe we don’t know everything? He could have been handled by the FBI.”“It’s possible,” agreed the resident, “but someone from the United States wouldsurely have arrived to maintain ties with the agent, and besides, Amin is too much of a PolPot type to be our man.”Amstutz, who became the chief of mission following Dubs’s death, had five one-ononemeetings with Amin. Those were private meetings without protocol, and wereunknown even to Amin’s closest entourage. The media did not report them. According toAmstutz, Amin always “exhibited unbending animosity towards the United States” during450