The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

spoke with Amin,” Gromyko added. “He calmly and confidently assured me that thesituation is not as complicated as it may seem, and that it is under the control of the Afghanarmed forces.”“So, according to Amin, the leadership of Afghanistan doesn’t feel any anxiety?”Kirilenko asked.“That seems to be the case,” confirmed Gromyko flatly. “Amin told me that thesituation, in general, is normal. He claims that all of the governors are loyal to the lawfulgovernment. But our comrades are telling a different story. They say that the situation inHerat and a number of other places is alarming. I asked Amin what actions he considersnecessary for us to take. Amin firmly denied any threat to the regime. At the end of theconversation, he asked me to give his best regards to the members of the Politburo, and toLeonid Ilyich Brezhnev personally.“But approximately two or three hours later, we received word of growing unrest inHerat from our comrades. New masses of rebels, trained in Pakistan and Iran, werereported to be preparing to enter Afghan territory. Approximately half an hour later, welearned that Comrade Taraki had summoned Gorelov and Alexeyev for a meeting. Heappealed for help from the Soviet Union, including military equipment, ammunition, andfood. Everything is listed in the documents that you have in front of you. Taraki alsomentioned in passing that they might need our assistance on the ground and in the air. Itmeans that they want us to send our troops, both ground and aviation.”Having uttered this last phrase, which caused everyone in the room to look upanxiously, the minister of foreign affairs felt compelled to add a comment: “I believe thatwhen thinking about providing assistance to this country, we should consider the fact that360