The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

interpretation of events. However, the following is known for fact: on August 17, 1978, onehundred twelve days after the April Revolution, one of the main figures of the revolution wasimprisoned.On the eve of that event, the minister of defense was brought a message from thecommander of the Twentieth Division, which was stationed in Kunduz, in the north of Afghanistan.The message said the following: “Rebel forces captured the airport. We request assistance.”“Something is not right here,” thought Qadir, and ordered the officer on duty to contactKunduz to make sure that there was no mistake in the message. In a few minutes, he receivedanother plea for help from Kunduz. Qadir went to Taraki. “Here is the situation. I propose totransfer there a detachment of commandos from Fortress Bala Hissar.” At that time, Amin,Gulabzoi, and Watanjar entered Taraki’s office. Taraki showed them the message from Kunduz,and told about Qadir’s proposal to transfer a detachment of commandos to the area of theincident. Amin took the phone and called Kunduz. After his call was over, he said: “Everything iscalm in Kunduz. There are no rebels there. These are all Qadir’s intrigues. Surely he’s trying toengage the special forces to start another coup. He is good at it.”Qadir was outraged. He said to Taraki: “Who are you harboring here? This man is verydangerous. He is more dangerous than any enemy.”Having said that, the minister saluted Taraki and left the office. At that moment, it wasabsolutely clear to him what would happen next. He figured out the trick with Kunduz. Amin’sbrother Abdullah was recently appointed by the Revolutionary Council to be in charge of thenorthern zone. Surely it was he who organized the false alarms about rebels capturing the airport.The next morning, Gorelov and Zaplatin stopped by Qadir’s office as was their routine. Theminister cheerfully reported that nothing special occurred at night, that all military detachments196