The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

***On December 13, the “cook” who had infiltrated Amin’s inner circle, foreignintelligence officer Mikhail T., received the order to use a poison that had been deliveredfrom Moscow to take out Amin and his nephew Asadullah, who was in charge of Afghanstate security organs. The plan for the operation was as follows: Amin and Asadullah wereto be neutralized. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the temporary power vacuum, the mainsites of Kabul were to be suddenly attacked by the Army and KGB special forces, as well ascommandos and border troops. The “healthy forces” in the PDPA were to undertake asecondary task. They were supposed to participate in taking over the identified sites fromwithin.Chief Military Adviser Colonel General Magometov learned about the forthcomingaction literally on the eve of the offensive, almost by chance. Ustinov, who spoke with himover the phone, asked, “What’s the status of preparations to remove Amin from power?”Having learned that the adviser had heard nothing about the planned coup d’état, theminister ordered that he immediately meet with Andropov’s representative in Kabul.However, General Ivanov responded to Magometov without blinking an eye, claiming heknew nothing of the plan to overthrow Amin. Only when Magometov, outraged, made areference to the instructions of the Politburo member did Ivanov introduce him to the planfor the forthcoming operation.“And you are really hoping to succeed by engaging such limited forces againstseveral thousand of Amin’s guards, KAM operatives, and ranks of loyal Khalqis?” asked theastonished adviser after he finished reading the plan. It was unclear to him how the Afghanarmy would react. “Are you sure that the armed forces will not rise to protect their leader?”685