The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

attaché reported, “Amin managed to garner support even from his former opponents, byconfidentially informing them that when the right moment arrives, he will get rid of theRussians.” For now, according to the opinion of the military intelligence officer, therewould be no immediate changes in Afghanistan. The Russians had little choice but tosupport Amin—that was why his future was bright. “In any case,” concluded the Brit with adash of sarcasm, “he will remain in power at least until the next round of Palace ‘elections.’”Those documents demonstrate that it was not only the KGB who knew about thenew Afghan leader’s dual loyalties. Rumors of Amin’s plans (“When the right momentcomes, we will get rid of the Russians”) reached the ears of Western diplomats andintelligence operatives. It was only the conclusion of the British cable that was wrong. InNovember, when the cable was sent, Amin did not have a bright future in front of him. Hisfate had already been sealed.Opportunities for the CIA to maneuver on Afghan territory were limited. However,American special services continued to expand their activities in neighboring Pakistan.Those activities ranged from the collection and analysis of information arriving fromAfghanistan, organization of training camps for mujahadeen, and financial and otherassistance to leaders of Islamic parties and movements that were working to undermineKabul. In addition, American emissaries began working to form a coalition of differentcountries that were prepared to support Afghan radicals in their struggle to combat Sovietinfluence. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and China expressed readiness to partake in this effort.Communist China in this case cynically ignored class-based ideology and joined thereactionary mullahs to counter the growth of Soviet influence in the Central Asian region,as they were apprehensive about the Soviets strengthening their position there.624