The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Zaplatin repeated what he had already said and written many times before. Henoted that the Afghan army was entirely capable of resolving the issues that it faced, thatComrade Amin’s positions were correct, that Amin remained loyal to the Soviet Union andhad to be trusted more. Having heard this, the minister grew flushed.“Do you remember what you promised to me last time? You said that not one hairon Taraki’s head would be harmed. Do you remember saying that? What, then, are yourwords worth? Here—read this,” he said, and handed over a cable from Kabul that had beensigned by Bogdanov.The cable was brief. The issue about possible military intervention was implied,though not directly mentioned. The situation in Afghanistan was described as absolutelyhopeless.“I would not have signed this cable,” said Zaplatin firmly, returning the document tothe minister. “It contains an inaccurate interpretation.”“Wrong?” The marshal seemed beside himself. “Their very heads are at stake toprovide us with accurate analysis.”“If only those heads were sober…” started Zaplatin before Ogarkov issued him a kickunder the desk to interrupt the general before he got himself into trouble. The adviserceased. He almost had tears in his eyes, failing to understand why the minister trusted theKGB more than his own generals. Ustinov again glared at the adviser before shifting hisgaze to Ogarkov and Epishev. “There is nothing else to discuss,” he waved his hand. “It islate. Too late,” he repeated, as if to himself.Many years after, Vasily Zaplatin discovered that it was on that particular day thatthe Soviet Politburo members came to their final decision about the Soviet military645