The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Kabul. According to Amin, Puzanov compromised himself by having worked in Afghanistanunder the king and under Daoud, didn’t understand the essence of the April Revolution,and sent distorted information to Moscow about the situation in Afghanistan. Bogdanovwas greatly surprised to hear this account. From what he understood, Puzanov thoughtvery highly of Amin and tended to exaggerate Amin’s impact in his telegrams. The Afghanleader, having expressed his wish, was certain that it would be immediately forwarded toMoscow, but he miscalculated. The colonel was too smart for that. He considered itdangerous to become an intermediary in this sort of intrigue. Besides, who knows whatAmin said about him to others, or about other Soviet representatives?However, the Afghan vice-premier hadn’t forgotten about his conversation withBogdanov. He tried to check through other channels whether his wish was relayed to theCenter.Having concluded his meeting with Bogdanov, Kryuchkov invited his deputy,General Medyanik, who was in charge of Oriental affairs. He asked Medyanik to share histhoughts regarding Amin. Yakov Prokofievich was not surprised when he was asked this.He reported the following:“Our colleagues in the American section and we are just beginning to work out theissue of Amin’s stay in the United States. We don’t have much information yet. Whenstudying at Columbia, Amin was close with Pazhvak—the former minister of education anda fervent anti-communist. They drank together and enjoyed each other’s company. On theway back from the States, Amin stopped in Western Germany to visit the Afghanambassador in Bonn, Ali Ahmad Popal, an openly pro-Western and anti-Soviet politician.We don’t know details of their conversations. The question is, what do this self proclaimed245