The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

intervention. He had a very vague idea of the Afghan reality, but was firmly convinced that nothingwas beyond the Bolsheviks’ potential. He thought that as long as he sent the experts, they werebound to succeed. Internal party squabbles unfortunately did not appear to him to be worthy ofdiscussion.Qadir received the maps very soon. They were classified, so after having been used, theyhad to be signed for and turned over to General Gorelov. As for the disagreements, new advisersarrived in Afghanistan every day, but the situation continued to deteriorate. By the summer, theParchamis who had remained in the country and out of jail had gone underground. Qadir was nota Parchami. He still tried to stay out of the conflict, but by that time nobody could remain neutral.Those who didn’t come to Taraki and Amin on their knees swearing personal loyalty wereconsidered enemies and deemed expendable.In May, Amin, perhaps jokingly, asked the minister of defense to bestow the rank of generalon him.“This is not within my powers,” replied Qadir. “Only the head of state has the power tobestow the rank of general.”“My dear Qadir,” he said, wagging his finger, “you simply refuse to recognize mycontribution to the success of our armed uprising.”By then, a brochure that praised Amin and the Khalqis exclusively for the success of therevolution was published and widely distributed in Kabul.In August, Amin invited Qadir for a visit. There was good reason for the invitation. Theminister of defense became a member of the Central Committee of the PDPA, which was a sign of ahigh degree of trust. Amin’s daughter poured expensive Scotch whiskey. There was a map ofAfghanistan made from semi-precious stones hanging from the living room wall.194