The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

After Daoud’s visit to Moscow, the Kabul KGB resident received a cable containing adirective to meet with K. Babrak (the Soviet leaders’ way to name Babrak Karmal at thetime) and M. Taraki and to draw their attention to the necessity of uniting Parcham andKhalq, “with the purpose of defending the interests of workers, peasants, and all workinggroups of Afghan society, based on cooperation with the republican regime and thegovernment of the republic led by M. Daoud.” *Time passed. Gradually, Moscow’s recommendations regarding the unification of theparty became more insistent. During meetings with Taraki and Karmal, Soviet friends muchmore frequently demanded answers to questions such as, “What is necessary to achieve theunification of the party?” and “How long should one wait for the unification to occur?”In such cases Taraki would usually say that he was not against unification as long asthe Parchamis—“prodigal sons”—would repent their “narrow-minded sectarianism andrevisionism, and return into the fold of the PDPA.” Such a position was clearly unacceptableto Babrak, as the fault for the ten-year-long party schism would then fall squarely on hisshoulders. He insisted on the principle of parity during unification. The Central Committeeof the CPSU supported his position.After Daoud’s visit to Moscow in April 1977, when the Afghan president remarked,in regards to the PDPA, that “friendship between our two countries requires nointermediaries,” Taraki found himself under heavy pressure. Soviet handlers from theCentral Committee demanded that the two sides stop fighting or else Moscow would ceaseall political and financial support. From May to June 1977, meetings were held between theleaders of the PDPA and staff members of the CPSU Central Committee’s International* Translator’s note: emphasis in the original72