The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Karmal’s faith in popular support was such that he even wrote a memorandum tothe Soviet leadership. The essence of it was not to waste any time moving forward againstAmin, because Amin would fall under the pressure of the masses as soon as he, Karmal, andother party members openly appealed to people to rebel.Only one thing was of concern to Babrak Karmal in those days. “ComradeVladimirov,” as Kryuchkov was introduced to Karmal and his friends, once came to theirsecret dacha. The guest mentioned in passing, over a cup of tea, the possibility that ifcircumstances require, some Soviet troops would enter Afghanistan. “In order to support‘the healthy forces’ of the party in their struggle,” explained “Comrade Vladimirov” vaguely.Karmal, who figured out that their guest was a representative of top KGB leadership,attempted to object. “We are capable of dealing with this task ourselves. I sent amemorandum to the Central Committee where I explained that as soon as the signal tobegin the uprising is given, Amin will be swept away by our comrades who are currently inhiding and by the broad masses that deplore Amin. You don’t know Afghans well. I assureyou, our people are not able to tolerate this tyrant any longer.”“There is no doubt about this, Comrade Karmal,” said the guest, humbly bowing hishead. “I would like to emphasize once again, that we will take such extreme measures onlyif we have serious reasons to doubt that the forces currently available will be able to fulfillthis task. Secondly, if any Soviet military detachments are brought into Afghanistan, theywill stay there only as long as it takes to transfer power. Once the situation is stabilized, thetroops will return to their permanent bases in the Soviet Union right away.” Having noticedthat the future leader of Afghanistan turned gloomy, “Comrade Vladimirov” decided tomake reference to the highest authority: “Believe me, Comrade Karmal, the Soviet670