The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

aised an important and sensitive issue.“It would be good,” Carter said, “if the détente that is now underway in Europewould spread to other regions in which the United States and the USSR havedisagreements. We have vital interests in some of those regions, and the USSR shouldrecognize this.” Carter paused, obviously preparing to say something very important. Theable members of the Soviet delegation became tense. “Some of these vitally importantregions are the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. We appeal to you to show restraintthere, so that the status quo and the interests of our national security are not affected.There are many problems in Iran and Afghanistan, but the United States does not interferein the internal affairs of those states. We hope that the Soviet Union will do the same.”Having finished, the American president looked at Brezhnev expectantly. LeonidIlyich remained silent. He had no prepared response for such an intervention. He turned toGromyko with hope, as if saying, “Help, Andrei Andreyevich.” However, the minister offoreign affairs maintained an icy silence in response to Brezhnev’s look. Carter had broughtup the issue of spheres of influence, and such an issue could not be addressedspontaneously.In order to mitigate the situation, the general secretary uttered a clichéd response:the Soviet Union had never interfered in the domestic politics of Afghanistan, and expectedthe United States to do the same. That was the end of the exchange.Later, Carter’s smart and cynical national security adviser, Brzezinski, wrote in hismemoirs that they did not succeed in engaging the Russians in a detailed discussion ofAmerican geopolitical concerns while in Vienna. It is most likely that the Americanpresident had been prompted by Brzezinski to touch the nerve of divided spheres of439