The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

doubt flickered across his face. Sometime in December, the minister’s mood seemed tochange. He began to flatly reject any counterarguments to the scenario of militaryintervention.The mood of the minister of foreign affairs changed noticeably as well. After hisvisits to the Central Committee, Gromyko appeared grim, irritated, and refused to respondto cautious questions from his closest colleagues. The minister’s position regarding militaryintervention has remained unclear, although Gromyko always voted “correctly,” that is,according to Brezhnev’s wishes.***Babrak Karmal and his closest allies had been living for over a month at a secretPGU base in the Moscow suburbs. It had been a long time since they had received theirinstructions, agreed on their new appointments, and put together the necessarydocuments. Karmal’s address to the Afghan people, which was to be broadcast over theradio after the planned regime change, was recorded on tape. Lists of the new members ofthe Revolutionary Council, Politburo, and government staff were agreed upon. Karmal heldthe top positions in all of the state and party structures. They discussed who of Amin’sclosest allies deserved capital punishment and who was to be imprisoned.The mute question “When?” could be gleaned in Karmal’s eyes every time he met hisSoviet intelligence handlers. All of the waiting was exhausting him. Alexei Petrov was hismost frequent visitor.“The situation should ripen,” he would say. “Be patient for a little while longer.”Sarwari, Gulabzoi, and other opposition activists who had been brought togetherfrom all over the world were the first to move south towards the border in late November.668