The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

carry out a coup d’etat by overthrowing Taraki. This information was news to bothMerimsky and Pavlovsky (as it turned out later). Merimsky responded in very genericterms, hinting that such information required comprehensive verification. Ivanov agreedwith him and asked Merimsky not to tell anyone about the information. However, in theevening, when the generals retired to their residence, Merimsky was paid a visit byGorelov.“What was Boris Semyonovich telling you? Most probably, he was trying to convinceyou that Hafizullah Amin is an American spy. This is nonsense! KGB men always fantasizeabout spies and saboteurs. I am certain that Comrade Amin is an honest revolutionary, aloyal and sincere friend of the Soviet Union. You will have plenty of opportunities in thefuture to see it for yourself.”At the time, Kabul was filled with rumors about the “second-ranking person in theDRA” being an American spy. There were even leaflets with that information disseminatedin the city. It was unknown who authored and dispersed them.Gorelov and Ivanov were invited to report on the situation in Afghanistan at aPolitburo session in Moscow. It was there that the conflict between the head of the Sovietmilitary advisory mission and representatives of the KGB became evident. Gromyko,Andropov, Ustinov, and Head of the General Staff Ogarkov subjected the two generals to abarrage of questions about the potential of the counter-revolutionary movement, themilitary capabilities of the Afghan army, the relationships among the leaders of the DRA,and the reasons for past failures. Gorelov was firm in his assessment: contradictions in theleadership can be overcome, and that will require Moscow to trust Amin more; Afghanarmed forces are capable of defending the revolution even if Pakistan dared to begin direct496