The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

World War II, Prince Daoud Khan, then a commander of the garrison of Kabul, supportedcollaboration with the Nazis, and that he was not as simple as the Kremlin wished tobelieve. They also realized that the honest and sometimes denunciatory reports they sentabout Daoud’s regime were not reaching the top leaders in Moscow, but were filtered outand stove piped. They feared that the key players in the Soviet Union were entertainingfalse notions about President Daoud and the Afghan republican regime, and that it wouldresult in mutual misunderstanding between the leaders of the two countries. Soon thosefears materialized.In April 1977, during the Afghan president’s official visit to Moscow, Brezhnev,under the impression that Daoud was a true “friend and brother” of the Soviet Union,expressed concerns about “research activities” conducted by the United States along theborders of the USSR under the aegis of the United Nations. Brezhnev had intelligencecontaining proof that CIA agents worked there under the cover of “UN staff.” Naturally, theSoviet leader could not refer specifically to the intelligence information. Daoud’s reaction toBrezhnev’s words was unexpectedly agitated. He explained that the issue of granting or notgranting expert access to different sites was exclusively within the realm of authority of theAfghan government, and he wouldn’t want Soviet friends interfering in the domestic affairsof Afghanistan.Brezhnev stoically accepted Daoud’s rebuttal. However, it would not be the last oneduring those negotiations.Sticking to the text prepared in advance, Brezhnev asked the Afghan leader abouthis intentions regarding cultivation of ties with the PDPA. The general secretary consideredhis question to be an innocent one, but Daoud became irritated again and offered a strained18