The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

minister understood the difficulties in implementing these ideas. He knew that both thehead of the General Staff and his deputies did not share his enthusiasm for intervention,and he kept his plans secret until the appropriate moment. Judging by his various remarks,Ustinov’s entourage could guess that tough times were about to arrive in Afghanistan.In a very small group, Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov, Gromyko, and Ponomaryovdiscussed how best to realize a return to “Lenin’s model of party leadership” in the PDPA.The potential for participation of the opposition leaders from Parcham and the offendedKhalqis was taken into consideration. The First Chief Directorate emerged as the primaryparty to carry out this task.General Ivanov, who returned to Kabul from Moscow on November 10, privatelyinformed his colleagues Bogdanov, Osadchiy, and Chuchukin that the Soviet leadership hastaken a confidential decision to “assist the healthy elements” in the PDPA.“This means that Amin will be replaced at the top of the Afghan government,”clarified Boris Semyonovich, adding, “it’s possible that Babrak Karmal may return to power.You must keep this a secret—the three of you are the only ones who know this for now;nobody else does.”Given this new development, the participants of the meeting identified the nextobjectives that the KGB resident’s and representative’s groups needed to pursue. Ivanovmade them swear to absolute secrecy once again as the meeting adjourned, adding that noteven the Soviet ambassador was to find out about these plans.Boris Semyonovich returned to Moscow as the newly appointed head of an advisorygroup to the chairman of the KGB. General Kirpichenko, the former head of the top-secret“S” Division (Covert Intelligence), was appointed in his place to become the first deputy638