The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

possible only under the condition of Soviet military assistance. At that time, YuriVladimirovich thought it sufficient to involve the forces and means of the KGB and Ministryof Defense that were already stationed and available in Afghanistan. In order to ensuresuccess, he proposed creating a military group in the areas bordering Afghanistan thatcould be engaged, if necessary, from the other side of the Amu Darya.It is known that during those days, Andropov often met and had long conversationswith Ustinov.It is also known that Andropov was in a state of strong spiritual anxiety and stress.He was tormented by uncertainty, and he was obviously doubtful of the success of theforthcoming operation * .As to the minister of defense, he most likely did not need to be convinced of the needto extend “international assistance” or to “restore Leninist principles in the Afghanleadership.” By that time, he himself had come to the conclusion that a military scenariowith the direct participation of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was inevitable. He also hadstrong arguments in favor of such a scenario.For many years, the minister of defense had gradually expanded an arsenal thatincluded nuclear warheads, fighter jets, submarines, missiles, military bases, conventionalarmaments, and reconnaissance stations so as not to cede strategic advantage to the UnitedStates. Relative strategic parity existed for a period of time. The other difficulty for theSoviet Union was maintaining strategic parity under circumstances of a colossal imbalancein its economy, which was tilted towards the needs of the military-industrial complex.Military expenditures devoured up to eighty percent of the GDP. However, by the late* The memoirs of the chief Kremlin physician, E.I. Chazov, refer to this particular state of mind during theperiod in question.664