The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

the translation, was shocked. It was clear to everybody that this brochure was not theresult of an independent act of the Political Directorate, but rather a document designed bythe head of state himself.“We must report this to Moscow immediately,” said Bogdanov.“Lev Nikolayevich,” began the ambassador, who looked as if he’d seen a ghost. “Thisis a lie. You were there yourself—you know what happened.”Gorelov himself looked astonished. “Yes, it is very strange,” he respondeduncertainly.The next day the situation took a turn for the worse. Shah Wali, the minister offoreign affairs and a member of the Politburo, called the ambassadors of socialist countriesand read to them “The Truth about Taraki’s Failed Assassination Attempt on ComradeAmin.” Safronchuk represented the Soviet embassy at the gathering because Amin hadcalled for a meeting with Puzanov for some insignificant reason. After Shah Wali finishedreading, the diplomats turned to Safronchuk. What was that? What did that mean? A wishto remove the current Soviet ambassador from Kabul? The beginning of Amin’s nextintrigue? Or was the new leader demonstrating a newly found independence, some kind ofa new political course, to Moscow?“Were you personally present at this so-called assassination attempt on ComradeAmin’s life?” Safronchuk asked the Afghan foreign minister.“No,” he responded, “but these are the findings of the investigation that weconducted.”612