The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Kryuchkov had to issue the signal to begin, but he was not in a hurry. He knew whatwas at stake. He was slow not because he doubted the rationale for the forthcoming action;in fact, his positions on this matter were firm. There could be no doubt about actionsmounted in the interest of the Soviet Union and the international socialist movement.Kryuchkov moved slowly to ensure that no failures would occur and interfere with theplanned operation or put it at risk.Per Kryuchkov’s directive, Bogdanov and Osadchiy mobilized all of the resources attheir disposal, including agents who had been recruited from among Soviet citizens. All ofthose agents were ordered, without any explanation of the underlying reasons, to be onhigh alert around the clock and to continue collecting information about everythingrelating to Amin, his services, government structures, and any movement of military units.The head of PGU reported back the following: “Over 1,500 military advisers and specialists,all of the operatives of the KGB and intelligence, operatives of Zenit, as well as the agentsfrom the Soviet colony—one hundred three agents and fifteen trusted persons—areinvolved in collecting information.”Operatives of the super-secret Eighth Department of the “S” Directorate (CovertIntelligence), as well as almost all officers from the Department of PGU in charge ofAfghanistan, were sent to Kabul from Yasenevo. The Zenit operatives who had beenmobilized from different KGB units from around the Soviet Union had already arrived. Inaddition to those, Kryuchkov received a strong boost from Andropov, who deployed toKabul operatives from Group A (Anti-Terror), which belonged to the Seventh Directorate ofthe KGB. Those operatives arrived in Kabul along with the head of the Seventh Directorate,Lieutenant General Beschastnov.684