The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

A serious suspicion grew in Sarwari’s mind. Was it possible that “the loyal pupil ofthe leader of the Afghan nation” did not want stability in the DRA? Was it possible that hewas purposefully rocking the boat? But why would he? In order to emerge as a leader of thenation? Then what about Comrade Taraki? What destiny did Amin have in mind for Taraki?By spring, Sarwari started to find various reasons not to fulfill Amin’s orders. Hemade up different excuses: the need to collect additional evidence, to investigate theconnections of those who were under suspicion, and so on. He started to avoid takingdecisive measures such as “sending people off to Pakistan.” Amin called the head of AGSAinto his office and confronted him. In the most aggressive way, he accused Sarwari of losinghis revolutionary fervor and becoming incompetent. Assadullah listened to the offensesobediently, but he was deeply insulted. That was the kind of insult that a Pashtun wouldnever forgive. As he was very familiar with Amin’s style, Sarwari realized that the next stepwould be removal from his AGSA position and an exile abroad as an ambassador, orpossibly something considerably worse.In a private setting over a cup of tea, Sarwari shared his concerns with his closestfriend, the minister of communications, Gulabzoi, whose life Sarwari saved during the AprilRevolution. Gulabzoi, who considered himself to be Taraki’s adopted son, became veryconcerned—not about his own life, but about the threat that Amin posed to Taraki. Heagreed that it was obvious that Hafizullah Amin was clearing the path to supreme power inAfghanistan for himself.“Boris Semyonovich, do you remember the report in early May about myconversation with Sarwari?” asked Bogdanov when Bubnov paused.“Share it with the comrades, let them know about it,” suggested Ivanov.433